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THE MISSING DIRECT-TENDER OPTION IN
FEDERAL THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE: A
PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL
ANALYSIS
DANE S. CIOLINOt
GARY

R.

ROBERTStt

Under the present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, third-party
practice under Rule 14 in nonadmiraltycases is limited to "indemnity
impleader." Thus, a defendant in a civil action may not impleada third
party unless the defendant has a right of indemnity or contribution
against that thirdpartyfor all orpart of the plaintiffs claim. By con-

trast,a defendant in an admiralty action may also implead thirdparties
who may be liable to the plaintiff directly. The authors refer to admi-

ralty's more liberal third-party practice as "tendered-defendant

impleader."
In this Article, Mr. Ciolino and ProfessorRoberts explain the historical reasons for the divergence between civil and admiralty thirdpartypractices. They discuss the practicaladvantages andpolicy objec-

tives achieved by direct-tenderpractice and conclude that the Federal
Rules should retain admiralty's tendered-defendani impleader and
adopt it for all civil cases.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) permits a defendant to implead a
third party "who is or may be liable to [that defendant] for all or part of the

plaintiff's claim against him."' This rule enables the defendant to recoup all or
part of any money judgment entered against him in favor of the plaintiff. The

impleaded third party ultimately can be liable only to the defendant, however,
and only if the defendant is liable to the original plaintiff.2 Such "indemnity
t Member of the New York Bar. Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City.
B.A. 1985, Rhodes College; J.D. 1988, Tulane Lair School.
tt Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. B.A. 1970, Bradley University; J.D. 1975, Stanford
Law School.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
2. Thus, under rule 14(a) the third party's liability must be derivative rather than direct. E.g.,
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Sullivan, 846 F.2d 377, 381 (7th Cir. 1988) (rule 14(a) only
applicable when the "third-party's liability [is] derivative"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2428 (1989);
Forum Ins. Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 711 F. Supp. 909, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (rule 14(a) "impleader is
proper only when the third-party defendant [is derivatively] liable.., to the third-party plaintiff");
Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F. Supp. 1413, 1422 (W.D. La. 1988) ("a defendant has no
right under Rule 14(a) to implead a non-party who is [directly] liable to plaintiff"). See generally 6
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1446 (1971 & Supp. 1988)
[hereinafter 6 WRIGHT & MILLER] ("The secondary or derivative liability notion is central" to as-
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impleader" actions most commonly include claims for indemnity or
contribution.
By contrast, rule 14(C) 3 does not limit third-party practice to indemnity
impleader. 4 It permits a defendant to implead a third party "who may be
serting a third-party claim under Rule 14(a)); 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTIcE
14
(1989) (analyzes rule 14, including explanation of derivative liability requirement of rule 14(a)).
A defendant, however, also can assert nonderivative claims against third parties. The outcome
of such direct claims does not depend upon the outcome of the original plaintiff's claim against the
defendant. There are at least two situations in which such affirmative claims might arise.
First, when the defendant brings either a counterclaim against the plaintiff, see FED. R. Civ. P.
13(a), (b), or a cross-claim against a codefendant, see id. rule 13(g), the defendant (that is, the counterclaim/cross-claim plaintiff) can join additional codefendants on the counterclaim or cross-claim.
See id. rule 13(h). The claims against those additional parties, however, must arise out of "the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" as the counterclaim or cross-claim.
See id. rules 13(h), 19 & 20.
Second, when the defendant impleads a rule 14(a) third party, he mayjoin any additional claims
that he has against that third party. See id. rule 18(a). In this situation, the federal rules do not
require that such claims arise out of the same "transaction or occurrence" as the rule 14(a) claim or
as the plaintiff's claim. Thus, if such a claim had an independent basis of jurisdiction (for example,
if it presented a federal question or if the defendant and the third party were of diverse citizenship), it
would be permissible. If a defendant joined such an unrelated claim, however, most courts likely
would exercise their authority under federal rule 42 and sever the claim for trial. See id. rule 42(b),
Nevertheless, the unrelated claim would be part of the suit for pretrial purposes (including discovery), and thus could put an enormous burden on the plaintiff who has nothing to do with the unrelated dispute. Although this situation seems unjustifiable, the existing Federal Rules permit it. See
id. rule 14(a).
3. Rule 14(c) provides as follows:
When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule
9(h), the defendant or claimant, as a third-party plaintiff, may bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly liable, either to the plaintiff or to the third-party
plaintiff, by way of remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. In such a case the third-party
plaintiff may also demand judgment against the third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff, in which event the third-party defendant shall make any defenses to the claim of the
plaintiff as well as to that of the third-party plaintiff in the manner provided in Rule 12 and
the action shall proceed as if the plaintiff had commenced it against the third-party defendant as well as the third-party plaintiff.
FED. R. Clv. P. 14(c).
4. Both rule 14(c) and rule 14(a) permit typical "indemnity" impleader. Some courts have
failed to recognize this, however. For example, in Rosario v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines,
531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that rule 14(c) was "inapplicable" because the defendant sued the third-party

defendant seeking judgment in its favor and not in favor of plaintiff. Id. at 1232-33.
Despite some confusion on this point, the majority of courts have used rule 14(c) unreservedly
for indemnity impleader. See, ag., Parks v. United States, 784 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1986); Parker v.
Gulf City Fisheries, 803 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1986); Jefferson Barracks Marine Serv. v. Casey, 763
F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1985); Hillier v. Southern Towing, 714 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Oil Spill
by the Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Joiner v. Diamond
M Drilling Co., 677 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1982); Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246
(5th Cir. 1979); Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970); Tri-State Oil Tool
Indus. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1969); American Home Assurance Co,
v. L & L Marine Serv., 688 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 875 F.2d
1351 (8th Cir. 1989); Lewis v. M/V Pablo, No. CIV. A. 86-1287 (E.D. La. Jan. 14, 1987)
(WESTLAW, FADM-CS database); Duhon v. Koch Exploration Co., 628 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. La.
1986); Exxon Chem. Int'l Supply, S.A. v. M/V Agia Skepi, No. 82 Civ. 0144, slip op. (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 1982) (LEXIS, Admrty library, Uscts file); In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex.
1982), vacated in part, 610 F. Supp. 306 (1984); Nynaes Petroleum AB v. Transworld Oil, Ltd,, 1981
A.M.C. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Bath Iron Works Co., No. 77 Civ. 2817 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (LEXIS, Admrty library, Uscts file); Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Serv., 87 F.R.D. 353 (E.D.
La. 1980); Tatlow & Pledger (PTY), Ltd. v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 456 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y.
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wholly or partly liable.., to theplaintiff... on account of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences." 5 Once the defendant "de-6
mand[s] judgment against the third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff,"

"the action... proceed[s] as if the plaintiff had commenced it against the third-

party defendant as well as the [original defendant]." '7 In such a case, the tendered third party must answer the relevant claims in the plaintiff's complaint in
1978); Northern Contracting Co. v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Morse Electro Prods. Corp. v. S.S. Great Peace, 437 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1977); Oroco
Marine, Inc. v. National Marine Serv., 71 F.R.D. 220 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Sanchez v. Loyd W. Richardson Constr. Corp., 56 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Cantey v. Flensburger Dampfercompagnie
Harald Schuldt & Co., 55 F.R.D. 127 (E.D.N.C. 1971); McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34
(S.D. Tex. 1968). In any event, it is ultimately inconsequential whether courts utilize rule 14(c) or
rule 14(a) in this context; there are no principled distinctions between indemnity impleader under
rule 14(c) and rule 14(a). See 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1465, at 346 ("Rule 14(c)
indemnity claims should not be treated any differently than Rule 14(a) indemnity claims .... ");
Note, Admiralty PracticeAfter Unification: Barnacleson the ProceduralHull, 81 YALE L.J. 1154,
1176 (1972) ("unification has created a single procedure with respect to indemnity claims, notwithstanding their separate mention in Rule 14(c)"). Why rule 14(c) contains this redundant indemnity
impleader provision is unclear. See infra note 24.
5. FED. R_ Civ. P. 14(c) (emphasis added).
6. Id.; see Campbell Indus. v. Offshore Logistics Int'l, 816 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1987)
(defendant must "demand judgment" to invoke rule 14(c)); Northern Contracting,439 F. Supp. at
623 n.1 ("[N]otwithstanding [defendant's] reference to FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c), the third-party complaint does not demand judgment against [third party] to be entered in favor of plaintiffs."); Rosario
v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, 395 F. Supp. 1192, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Memorandum and
Order) ("[T]he defendant and 3rd party plaintiff did not demand judgment in favor of plaintiff but
rather demanded judgment in favor of itself. Consequently, the government must be treated as a
true [indemnity] 3rd party defendant for all purposes."), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 857 (1976).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c); see also Campbell, 816 F.2d at 1406 ("When the admiralty defendant
elects to require the third-party defendant to answer the plaintiff's complaint directly, the court
treats the action as if the plaintiff had commenced it against the defendant and third-party defendant
jointly."); Riverway Co. v. Trumbull River Servs., 674 F.2d 1146, 1154-55 (7th Cir. 1982) (Under
Rule 14(c), third-party complaint demanded that the court treat the "action as if [plaintiff] had

commenced it against [third.party defendant and original defendant] as joint defendants."). For
procedural purposes courts usually do follow the mandate of rule 14(c) and approach tendereddefendant claims "as if" commenced by the plaintiff against the third-party. A number of examples
illustrate this significant practical difference from indemnity third-party practice.
First, individuals suing the United States must submit certain claims to the appropriate government agency prior to filing suit. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976). If a
defendant tenders the United States to a plaintiff on such a claim, the plaintiff arguably first must
submit that claim to the agency. Cf. Rosario v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, 395 F. Supp.
1192, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (court recognized but did not resolve this issue), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1227 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
Second, if the plaintiff and the tendered third party have not previously agreed to arbitration,
but the defendant and that third party have, the plaintiff need not arbitrate prior to pursuing the
tendered claim. McSwegan v. United States Lines, 688 F. Supp. 867, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Conversely, if the plaintiff and the tendered third party have agreed to arbitrate, the plaintiff should not
be able to pursue the tendered third party prior to invocation of the alternative dispute resolution
procedure. But see United States v. Bath Iron Works, No. 77 Civ. 2817 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (LEXIS,
Admrty library, Uscts file) (court allowed the plaintiff to proceed against a tendered defendant despite mutually agreed upon "disputes clause" requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies).
Third, a tendered third-party defendant is eligible for reimbursement of costs and fees incurred
through defending against a plaintiff's claim to the same extent as is a defendant that plaintiff sues
directly. See Campbell, 816 F.2d at 1406 (tendered third party defended against defendant's indemnity claim as well as plaintiff's anchor claim).
Fourth, unlike an indemnity third-party defendant, a tendered third party is not necessarily
released when the plaintiff dismisses the original impleading defendant. The tendered defendant
must continue to defend against the plaintiff's direct claim as would any other defendant that the
plaintiff sued originally. See Avery v. United States, 829 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1987); cf. Gauthier v.
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addition to the third-party complaint. 8 If ultimately liable, the third party must

pay damages directly to the original plaintiff. 9 In effect, rule 14(c) allows the
original defendant to tender an additionaldefendant to the plaintiff, from whom
the plaintiff can then recover directly. To distinguish this form of third-party

practice from "indemnity impleader," several courts and commentators have
used the misleading term "substitute defendant" impleader.' 0 However, because

the original defendant is not relieved of potential liability, the tendered third
party is not really a "substitute"; hence, this Article instead characterizes this
practice as "tendered-defendant impleader."
Although rule 14(c) impleader is significantly more liberal than rule 14(a)
impleader, I I defendants rarely may use it. This is so because rule 14(c) is appli-

cable only when at least one of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant is an
admiralty claim.' 2 But this has not always been the case.
Crosby Marine Serv., 87 F.R.D. 353 (E.D. La. 1980) (plaintiff who dismisses charges against one
defendant may remain a third-party defendant to cross-claims asserted by a remaining defendant).
Fifth, the proper party to dismiss a tendered third party defendant voluntarily is the plaintiff to
whom the party was tendered-not the defendant who originally impleaded the third party. See
Turner v. Central Marine Serv., No. 87-755 (E.D. La. entered March 13, 1989) (Order of Dismissal).
Finally, the statute of limitations on a plaintiff's tendered claim tolls when the defendant tenders the third party to the plaintiff. On that date, courts consider the plaintiff to have "commenced"
the action against the third party. Lewis v. M/V Pablo, No. CIV. A. 86-1287 (E.D. La. Jan. 14,
1987) (WESTLAW, FADM-CS database). In contrast, when the defendant impleads a third party
for indemnity, the statute of limitations on the defendant's indemnity claim tolls on the date that the
plaintiff filed suit against the original defendant. Id.
For a discussion of how courts should treat tendered defendant claimsjursidictionally,see infra
notes 94-205 and accompanying text.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c); see, e.g., Campbell, 816 F.2d at 1406; Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S.
Hermes, 765 F.2d 306, 313 (2d Cir. 1985). Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (third-party defendant
need only answer third-party complaint) with id. 14(c) (third-party defendant must also answer
plaintiff's complaint).
9. See, eg., Riverway, 674 F.2d at 1154; Ohio River Co. v. Continental Grain Co., 352 F.
Supp. 505, 512-13 (N.D. 11. 1972).
10. See, eg., Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and JurisdictionAfter the 1966 Unification, 74
MICH. L. REv. 1627, 1652-53 & n.143 (1976); Note, supra note 4, at 1172.
11. The liberality of rule 14(c) extends beyond its tendered-defendant provision. See infra note
25.
12. E.g., Tipton v. General Marine Catering Co., No. 87-4647, slip op. (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 1989)
(LEXIS, Admrty library, Uscts file); Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F. Supp. 1413, 1417-19
(W.D. La. 1988) (because "plaintiff's action is ... a suit at law [not admiralty] ... defendants are
not entitled to invoke the benefits of Rule 14(c)"). Whether a claim is an "admiralty or maritime"
claim for purposes of rule 14(c) is governed by rule 9(h). Under that rule, courts may classify a
plaintiff's cause of action as an "admiralty... claim" under two circumstances.
First, courts consider a claim to be an admiralty claim by default, when only admiralty jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982), could support the plaintiff's claim. E.g., Truehart v. Blandon, 685
F. Supp. 956, 957 (E.D. La. 1988) (rule 9(h) designation implied when plaintiff brings an in rem
claim falling within the federal courts' exclusive admiralty jurisdiction); Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v.
International Great Lakes Shipping Co., No. 83 C 1059 (N.D. Il. Dec. 16, 1985) (WESTLAW,
FADM-CS database); see also, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h) (If "[a] claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes whether so identified or not."); T.N.T.
Marine Serv. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585, 588 (5th Cir.) ("an action
against a vessel in rem falls within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847
(1983). See generally 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1313, at
452-55 (1969 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter 5 WRIGHT & MILLER] ("If only grounds for admiralty
jurisdiction are shown in the pleading, the claim will be governed by the special [admiralty] rules
even in the absence of an identifying statement.").
Second, courts consider a claim to be an admiralty claim when both admiralty jurisdiction and
another basis of federal jurisdiction are viable alternatives, and the plaintiff designates the claim as a
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When promulgated with the Federal Rules in 1938,13 rule 14 allowed any
civil defendant to implead a third party "who is or may be liable to him or to the
plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." 14 Nevertheless,
when civil defendants sought to tender third parties directly to plaintiffs under
that rule, they often encountered significant court-imposed impediments. First,
courts generally did not require unwilling plaintiffs to pursue claims against tendered third parties.15 Second, a large majority of courts refused to apply supplemental jurisdiction (pendent, pendent party, or ancilary) 16 to the plaintiff's
rule 9(h) "admiralty" claim. Rg., Mitsubishi,No. 83 C 1059 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1985) (WESTLAW,
FADM-CS database); Fawcett v. Pacific Far E. Lines, 76 F.R.D. 519, 522 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
("Neither the [defendant's] subjective intention to bring the claim in admiralty nor its belief that
such a claim could only be brought in admiralty... is sufficient to excuse the lack of proper identification."); Duhon v. Koch Exploration Co., 628 F. Supp. 925, 928-29 n.8 (W.D. La. 1986). See
generally Armatur, S.A. v. Standard S.S. Owners Protection & Indem. Assoc., 710 F. Supp. 404

(D.P.R. 1989) (citing Rule 9(h) in a complaint without any explicit statement identifying the claim
as an admiralty claim is insufficient to overcome plaintiff's contrary expressions of intent); 5
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 1313, at 453 ("If the pleading shows that both admiralty and another
basis of federal jurisdiction exist, the suit will be treated as an admiralty claim... if the pleading...
contains a statement identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim.") (collecting cases).
By forcing the plaintiff to choose between admiralty and civil jurisdiction, rule 9(h) attempts to
eliminate confusion that could arise because "civil and admiralty actions are united under a single
iform of action." Pipp v. Tidewater trawlers, Inc., 1986 A.M.C. 2492, 2493-94 (E.D. Va. 1984)
(confusion over right to trial by jury). Once a litigant indicates her "desir[e] to obtain the benefits of
a particular type of law," she cannot then "reject the requirements of that type of action." Id.
13. See 308 U.S. 651 (1939) (presenting original federal rules prior to the 1966 unification of
admiralty and civil practice).
14. 3 J. MOORE, supra note 2, V 14.01[1.-1] (emphasis added). See generally Harrison,679 F.
Supp. at 1422 (noting that Rule 14(a), as originally promulgated, allowed defendant to implead a
party who may be liable to the plaintiff). An analogous provision also applied in admiralty cases.
See ADMIRALTY RULE 56 (repealed 1966); see also infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Bull v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 6 F.R.D. 7, 10 (D. Neb. 1946); Delano v. Ives,
40 F. Supp. 672, 673 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Md. 1941);
Satink v. Holland Township, 31 F. Supp. 229, 230 (D.N.J. 1940); Crim v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715, 718-20 (D.D.C. 1939); cf. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Saunders, 159 F.2d
481,483-85 (4th Cir. 1947) (defendant cannot compel plaintiff to sue third party whom plaintiff does
not wish to sue, particularly where joinder of third-party defendant would defeat jurisdiction). But
see Lommer v. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Serv., 4 F.R.D. 104, 104-05 (M.D. Pa. 1944); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 52 F. Supp. 177, 186 (M.D. Ga. 1943) (when
third-party complaint alleges that third party is liable to plaintiff, plaintiff and third party are opposing parties regardless of whether plaintiff so elects). The majority position noted in the text suggests
that if the plaintiff refused to proceed against a tendered third-party defendant, she was not precluded from subsequently raising the claim in another proceeding.
16. See, e.g., Friend v. Middle Atl. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778, 779 (2d Cir.) (defendant may not
cause third-party defendant to be brought into a federal civil action to answer to plaintiff's claim
where plaintiff and third-party defendants are citizens of the same state and federal jurisdiction does
not otherwise appear), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 865 (1946); Thompson v. Cranston, 2 F.R.D. 270, 271
(W.D.N.Y. 1942) (because plaintiffs and third-party defendants were citizens of same state, plaintiffs
could not amend complaint to add claim against third-party defendants), aff'd, 132 F.2d 631 (2d
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 305, 306
(E.D.N.Y. 1941) (amended complaint alleging claim against third-party defendant of same state as
plaintiff nullified on grounds of lack of diversity jurisdiction); Johnson v. G.J. Sherrard Co., 2
F.R.D. 164, 166 (D. Mass. 1941) (ancillary jurisdiction does not extend to plaintiff's amended complaint against third-party defendant of same state when jurisdiction is based solely on diversity);
Herrington v. Jones, 2 F.R.D. 108, 110 (E.D. La. 1941) (court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's
amended complaint against third-party defendant when court would lack jurisdiction if third-party
defendant were an original defendant). See generally Holtzoff, Some Problems Under FederalThirdParty Practice, 3 LA. L. REV. 408, 419-20 (1941).
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tendered claim if it lacked independent subject-matter jurisdiction. 17 Because

these problems appeared to render tendered-defendant practice largely illusory,
the Federal Rules Advisory Committee recommended, and in 1946 the Supreme
Court adopted, an amendment deleting the words "or to the plaintiff" from rule

14.18 As a result, since 1946 the Federal Rules have not allowed tendered-defendant practice in nonadmiralty civil cases.
Why tendered-defendant impleader evolved and continues to be employed

exclusively in maritime actions remains uncertain. 19 Undoubtedly, a major factor is simply historical. Before 1966 proctors in admiralty conducted maritime
practice under specialized admiralty rules instead of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Former Admiralty Rule 56, which governed maritime third party
practice, permitted an admiralty defendant to "bring in any other vessel or per-

son... who may be partly or wholly liable either to the libellant [plaintiff] or...
[the defendant] by way of remedy over, contribution or otherwise, growing out
of the same matter."'20 Thus, like pre-1946 federal rule 14, Admiralty Rule 56
liberally permitted defendants to implead any person who might be directly liable to the plaintiff and "to insist that the plaintiff proceed to judgment against
17. For example, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the tendered claim when
either of the following conditions existed:
(1) when both the claim against the defendant and the claim against the tendered defendant were based on diversity jurisdiction, the tendered third party would defeat complete diversity if he was a citizen of the plaintiff's state; or
(2) when (regardless of the basis of jurisdiction supporting either the third-party claim or
the plaintiff's original claim) the amount in controversy in the tendered claim was less
than the statutorily prescribed amount. The amount in controversy since May 18,
1989 has been $50,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), as amended by Pub. L. 100-202, Title
II, §§ 201 (Nov. 19, 1988); from 1958 until 1989 it was $10,000, see Act of July 25,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332), and it
was $3000 between 1911 and 1958, see Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087,
1091. See generally E. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 106 (1987).
Since 1980, however, there has been no amount in controversy requirement for federal
question cases. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a)(2)).
18. 3 J. MOORE, supra note 2,
14.15.
19. The first court to recognize tendered-defendant impleader was the Southern District of New
York in The Hudson, 15 F. 162, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). That court noted the following reasons why
liberal impleader is particularly desirable in admiralty cases: (1) to avoid inconsistent results in
separate actions arising out of the same incident; (2) to avoid the cost of multiple actions; and (3) to
avoid a third party disappearing before jurisdiction is properly exercised over him. Id. at 168-70.
Although these reasons certainly justify tendered-defendant impleader, they are no more compelling
in the admiralty context than in the civil context. Indeed, for precisely these reasons, rule 14(a)
permits indemnity impleader. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
Some commentators opine that the long-established practice of insuring marine risks caused
admiralty courts to recognize that it was inequitable for a plaintiff judicially to compel only one of
several underwriters to bear a maritime loss. See Colby, Admiralty Unification, 54 GEO. L.J. 1258,
1272 (1966); Comment, Third-PartyPracticein Admiralty: Ancillary Jurisdiction,28 Sw. L.J. 1021,
1023 (1974). But why is it inequitable for one insurer to cover an entire loss? Presumably, the
premium each insurer receives adequately compensates for that risk; that some insurers may avoid
liability and thus receive a windfall does not make it unfair for another to bear the entire loss.
Moreover, even if this justification is valid, it is now common for nonmaritime parties to be insured--often by multiple insurers. Thus, this rationale does not provide persuasive grounds for
treating admiralty practice differently from civil practice.
20. ADMIRALTY RULE 56 (emphasis added) (repealed 1966).
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the third-party defendant."' 21 When the Supreme Court unified admiralty and
civil practice in 1966,22 it retained admiralty tendered-defendant impleader in
federal rule 14(c). 23 This substantive recodification 24 of former admiralty rule
56 and pre-1946 federal rule 1425 thus partially resurrected tendered-defendant
21. See Frota Oceanica Brasileira v. M/V Alice St. Philip, 790 F.2d 412, 417 n.9 (5th Cir.
1986).
22. See Order, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1031 (1966).
The amendments and Advisory Committee's notes are reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966). Despite
unification, admiralty and civil practice remain distinct. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h) (pleading
special matters); id. 14(c) (impleader); id. 38(e) (right to trial by jury); id. 82 (effect on jurisdiction
and venue); Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. But granted unification never was intended to make admiralty and civil actions identical. See, 5 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 12, § 1313, at 452 (1969) (citing Penoro v. Reded A/B Disa, 376 F.2d 125, 130 (2d Cir.
1967); Frontier Acceptance Corp. v. United Freight Forwarding Co., 286 F. Supp. 367, 372 (D.N.J.
1968)).
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
24. Because rule 14(c) recodifies former Admiralty Rule 56, admiralty defendants seeking to
implead a third-party defendant for indemnity or contribution can proceed either under rule 14(a) or
under rule 14(c). See supra note 4. Thus, except for its tendered-defendant provisions, rule 14(c) is
redundant. It remains unclear why the drafters' treatment of rule 14(c)'s indemnity provisions is
"virtually indistinguishable from the third-party practice for all civil actions under Rule 14(a)."
Note, supra note 4, at 1176. The best explanation is probably that in their zeal to incorporate admiralty's distinctive tendered-defendant practice into the unified rules, the drafters simply reworded
and inserted all of admiralty rule 56's substance into rule 14(c) without considering the overlap with
rule 14(a).
25. Although the drafters of rule 14(c) essentially recodified the substance of former Admiralty
Rule 56 and pre-1946 federal rule 14, they went beyond rote recodification. Whether intentionally
or otherwise, they expanded the scope of those earlier rules in two significant respects.
First, under Admiralty Rule 56 the courts permitted tendering only when both the anchor
claim and the tendered claim were "in admiralty." See, e.g., Aktieselskabet Fido v. Braziliero, 283
F. 62, 72-73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1922); Young v. United States, 272 F.
Supp. 738, 742-43 (D.S.C. 1967); Capital Transp. Corp. v. Thelning, 167 F. Supp. 379, 380
(E.D.S.C. 1958); Warner v. The Bear, 126 F. Supp. 529 (D. Alaska 1955); see also McCann v.
Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (extensively discussing former Admiralty Rule 56
and its limitation to admiralty impleader). One modern court, however, has suggested that Admiralty Rule 56 permitted tendered claims having any independent basis of federal jurisdiction, regardless of whether that basis was in admiralty. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d
800, 810 n.12 (2d Cir. 1971). The only case support for this proposition, however, is dictum in a
single case in which Judge Learned Hand expressly declined to decide whether a nonadmiralty independent basis of jurisdiction would suffice for a tendered third-party claim. See Soderberg v. Atlantic Lighterage Corp., 19 F.2d 286, 287-88 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 542
(1927).
Despite this limitation on former Admiralty Rule 56 practice, rule 14(c) has no such maritime
claim condition. This is consistent with the liberal purpose of the 1966 unification: to create a single
federal forum in which all related claims between parties, admiralty and nonadmiralty, could be
resolved. See generally 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1465 (1971 & Supp. 1989) (detailing
post-unification jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime claims and related claims under Rule 14).

Only one court has disagreed and held that rule 14(c) bars nonadmiralty claims tendered directly to
the plaintiff. See McCann, 44 F.R.D. at 41-42. Even in McCann the court framed the issue as
"whether th[e] court.., has [ancillary] jurisdiction over a non-maritime third-party complaint filed
pursuant to Rule 14(c)." Id. at 40. Thus, its holding that rule 14(c) did not permit impleader
perhaps reflects the court's confusion of procedural and jurisdictional issues. Other courts, citing
McCann, have barred nonadmiralty tendered claims under rule 14(c). But the stated ground for
doing so in each case was the lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction-not that rule 14(c) gradually disallowed such claims. See Fawcett v. Pacific Far E. Lines, 76 F.R.D. 519, 521 (N.D. Cal.
1977); Stinson v. S.S. Kenneth McKay, 360 F. Supp. 674, 676 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (written by Judge
Noel who also authored McCann); Young, 272 F. Supp. at 742-43.
Second, under pre-1946 rule 14 a defendant could implead only a nonparty. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 14. In contrast to former rule 14, modern rule 14(c) allows an admiralty defendant to implead
and tender directly to the plaintiff parties alreadyjoined in the action. See Gauthier v. Crosby
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impleader in the Federal Rules.
This Article discusses tendered-defendant impleader, evaluates its usefulness, and concludes that it should be readopted for all civil cases. Because rule
14(c) currently allows tendered-defendant impleader in admiralty cases, this Article discusses practice under that rule to analyze procedural and jurisdictional
aspects of direct-tender practice. Part II considers the practical advantages of
direct-tender third-party practice. It initially explores the different circum-

stances under which a defendant meaningfully might employ tendered-defendant impleader. It then concludes that when such circumstances exist, tendereddefendant impleader furthers the important goals of resolving all related claims
in a single lawsuit and promoting settlement.
Part III explores the two primary purported disadvantages of tendered-defendant practice. Subpart III(A) addresses the argument that tendered-defendant impleader is impotent because it cannot force plaintiffs to proceed against
parties whom they otherwise would not choose to sue. It concludes that even if
courts cannot compel a plaintiff to proceed involuntarily against a tendered third
party, in most cases plaintiffs nevertheless will choose to pursue the tendered
claim. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff is reluctant, in order to facilitate the
efficient resolution of all related claims in a single proceeding, res judicata
should bar any unasserted tendered claim that a plaintiff fails to pursue.
Subpart III(B) considers and rejects the contention that the Federal Rules
should disallow tendered-defendant practice because tendered claims often lack
subject-matter jurisdiction. It argues that because independent bases of federal
jurisdiction often could support tendered claims, subject-matter jurisdiction issues are unlikely to arise in most cases. When this is so, mere hypothetical jurisdictional problems should not bar tendered-defendant practice. Furthermore,
just to assure that tendered claims are cognizable in federal court even if they do
lack an independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction arguably should extend to all tendered claims, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's apparent rejection of pendent party jurisdiction last term in Finley v.
26
United States.
This Article concludes that tendered-defendant impleader furthers valuable
policy objectives of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Rules not
only should retain rule 14(c)'s now anomalous tendering provision in admiralty
cases, but they also should readopt such a promise for all civil cases.
II.

TENDERED-DEFENDANT THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE

Although tendered-defendant third-party practice is significantly more liberal than typical indemnity impleader, tendering appears useful only in limited
circumstances. Nonetheless, when such circumstances exist, the practice both
Marine Serv., 87 F.R.D. 353, 354 (E.D. La. 1980); Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp., 375 F.
Supp. 764, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
26. 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (5-4 decision).
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benefits the original parties and furthers significant policy goals underlying the
Federal Rules.
A.

PracticalBenefits of Tendered-DefendantImpleader: When Tendering Is
Meaningful

Tendered-defendant impleader has substantive significance only upon the
coincidence of the following two circumstances: (1) when the defendant cannot
fully satisfy its interests through indemnity impleader of a potentially liable third
party under a derivative liability theory, and (2) when the original plaintiff has
not already sued the potentially liable third party.
1. When the Defendant Cannot Fully Satisfy Its Interests Through
Indemnity Impleader
If the defendant seeks to pursue a third party only under a derivative theory
of liability, rule 14(a) is an adequate device for the defendant to join that potentially liable party. Under such circumstances, there is no reason why the defendant would want to tender the third party to the plaintiff; the defendant can
implead the third party, assert indemnity or contribution claims, and, if appropriate, the court can order the third party to cover the defendant's direct liability
27
to the plaintiff.
In contrast, if the defendant has no derivative claim against the potentially
liable third party, indemnity impleader is an inadequate device to satisfy the
defendant's interests. 28 Such inadequacy exists, however, only when the defendant claims that he is not culpable, but another identifiable party is. In short, rule
14(a) indemnity impleader is not adequate, and tendering is meaningful, only
when the defendant alleges that the third party alone is the culpable party ("he
did it, not I").29 Stinson v. S.S. Kenneth McKay30 well illustrates such a
situation.
In Stinson a longshoreman sued a shipowner and its vessel (in rem) to recover for injuries he suffered aboard the vessel. Alleging that the plaintiff sustained all of his injuries while working for third parties, the defendants
impleaded those parties as third-party defendants. The court correctly recognized that the third parties "owed no duty to [the defendants] ... which would
27. See Jefferson Barracks Marine Serv. v. Casey, 763 F.2d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 1985) (defendant does not need to use 14(c) to recover from third party whom he could implead for "the purpose
of contribution").

28. See Forum Ins. Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 711 F. Supp. 909, 915-16 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (defendant could not satisfy its interests through rule 14(a) indemnity impleader because its claim against
the third party was nonderivative).
29. See generally Robertson, supra note 10, at 1652-53 & n.144 (illustrating the difference between "indemnity" third-party practice and "substitute defendant" third-party practice. Under the
former, "unless the plaintiff amends his complaint, no danger is made by or on behalf of the plaintiff
against the third-party defendant, and no judgment against the third party defendant can run in
favor of the original plaintiff."). For a "he-did-it-not-I" situation, see Woods v. Sammisa Co., 873
F.2d 842, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1989) (admiralty defendant "denied liability").
30. 360 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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support a cause of action"3 1 for indemnity. Furthermore, the defendants did not
allege that the third parties were a contributingcause of the plaintiff's injuries;
rather, they alleged that the third parties were the sole cause of those injuries.
Thus, because the defendants had no viable contribution or indemnity claims, if
they had joined the third parties under rule 14(a), the court would have had to
dismiss the claims for improper joinder. In contrast, rule 14(c)'s tendered-defendant provision permitted the assertion of the defendants' claims. Therefore,
the court could have sustained the third-party action;3 2 joinder and tender
would have been appropriate because
the third parties "may be wholly or partly
33
liable" directly to the plaintiff.
Even when the only proper way to join a potentially liable third party is
through tendered-defendant impleader,3 4 a defendant might decline to do so for

several reasons. First, the defendant does not stand to recover anything from a
tendered defendant on the third-party claim 35 (unlike in the indemnity impleader situation). Because only the plaintiff can recover from a directly tendered party, it is the plaintiff-not the defendant-who apparently has the most
to gain through tendered-defendant practice.

Second, irrespective of whether the defendant impleads the third party, the
defendant still can defend the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the nonim-

pleaded third party is solely responsible ("he did it, not I"). This defense would
31. Id. at 675.
32. The Stinson court dismissed the tendered-defendant claims on arguably erroneous subjectmatter jurisdiction grounds. Id. at 676; see also infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text (majority
of courts since 1966 have allowed tendered-defendant impleader under ancillary jurisdiction,
whether the third party claim is admiralty or nonadmiralty).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c); cf.Riverway Co. v. Trumbull River Servs., 674 F.2d 1146, 1154 (7th
Cir. 1982) (third-party defendant in 14(c) substitute defendant action unsuccessfully argued that it
could not be liable directly to plaintiff because it could not have been liable to defendant).
Professor Robertson describes another case in which Rule 14(c) could have allowed a thirdparty claim despite the absence of an indemnitee-indemnitor relationship. Robertson, supra note 10,
at 1653 n.144 (discussing Donaldson v. United States Steel Corp., 53 F.R.D. 228 (W.D. Pa. 1971)).
The Donaldson court dismissed the third-party complaint because no indemnity relationship existed.
It failed, however, to consider applying rule 14(c). The court stated:
iThe requirement ... that the relationship between the defendant, as a third-party plaintiff
and the third-party defendants be in reality one of plaintiff-defendant must be met. Under
the circumstances of this suit, there is no such relationship between the defendant as a
third-party plaintiff and the purported third-party defendants, for no relationship exists
between these two parties which would give rise independently to litigation between
themselves.
Donaldson, 53 F.R.D. at 230.
34. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
35. The defendant conceivably could recover from the tendered third party on any additional
claim that he permissively joins with the tendered claim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). But such claim
joinder may not be permitted under rule 18(a). That rule permits only "a party asserting a claim to
relief" to join such claims. Id. In the tendered defendant context, the original defendant asserts no
"claim to relief" of his own against the third party; he merely asserts the plaintiff's otherwise unasserted "claim to relief." See infra notes 94-114 and accompanying text. Therefore, rule 18(a) argua-

bly does not authorize the defendant to join additional claims against the tendered defendant,
Once the tendered defendant is a party to the litigation, however, the defendant could assert
cross-claims against him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g). But the defendant's right to do so would be
significantly more restricted than his right to assert rule 18(a) claims would have been; under rule
13(g) (unlike under rule 18(a)), the claim must "aris[e] out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein." Id.
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be technically just as viable, and might even be more persuasive if the purport36
edly culpable party were not in court to rebut the defendant's allegations.
For these reasons, a defendant who utilizes tendered-defendant impleader

arguably is doing little more than a favor for the plaintiff. Thus, a defendant
would likely hesitate before joining the purportedly culpable person as a party.
Other benefits of tendered-defendant impleader inure to the benefit of the de37
fendant, however, and often render its use more attractive than not.
a. Discovery benefits
The Federal Rules allow certain types of discovery to proceed only against
parties to litigation.
For example, parties may serve interrogatories only upon
"other part[ies]." 38 Likewise, requests for production of documents and
"things" and requests to inspect or survey land are available only against parties. 39 And, only a "party, or... a person in the custody.., of a party" may be
required to submit to a physical or mental exam for purposes of discovery. 40
Actually, the only discovery devices available against nonparties are depositions
upon oral 41 or written 42 questions. 43 These discovery considerations are certainly an incentive for the defendant to implead a potentially liable third party
rather than merely to defend against the plaintiff's suit; through the more extensive discovery procedures available against parties, the defendant might uncover
additional evidence to support his "he-did-it-not-I" defense.
b. Evidentiary benefits
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence any statement made by a party to a
suit that is offered against that party is not hearsay. 44 Therefore, if the defendant elects to implead a potentially liable third party, the defendant then could
36. Furthermore, the defendant might be able to satisfy his interests through abusing rule 14(a)
impleader. To implead a rule 14(a) "indemnity" third party, the defendant need not admit any
degree of liability. The defendant conceivably could implead for contribution an alleged joint
tortfeasor who, purportedly along with the defendant, caused the plaintiff's injury. As the litigation
progressed, the defendant could deny any liability to the plaintiff and frame the putative "indemnity" third-party defendant as the solely liable party. Ifthat third party (or the plaintiff) failed to file
a motion to dismiss for improper joinder, the matter would proceed to trial. If the factfinder then
agreed with the defendant and found that the third party was solely responsible, the defendant would

be exonerated from liability completely. The plaintiff, however, would be out of luck if she had

failed to amend her complaint to join the third-party defendant. The court could not enter judgment
against the third party in favor of the plaintiff since the plaintiff neither sued the third party directly,
nor did the defendant directly tender the third party to the plaintiff.
37. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.

38. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
39. Id. 34(a).

40. Id. 35(a).
41. Id. 30(a) ("After commencement of the action, any party may take the testimony of any
person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination.") (emphasis added).
42. Id. 3 1(a) ("After commencement of the action, any party may take the testimony of any
person, including a party, by deposition upon written questions.") (emphasis added).
43. In any case, through a subpoena duces tecum the deponent can be compelled to bring
documents to the deposition. Id. 31(b)(1).
44. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) ("A statement is not hearsay if... [it] is offered against aparty
.") (emphasis added).
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introduce any statement made by that party without encountering hearsay
problems. Such statements might include those tending to exculpate the defendant from liability. Another evidentiary incentive is that the deposition of a party
or an agent of a party may "be used [at trial] by an adverse party for any purpose."'4 5 If the defendant chose to depose, but not to implead, a potentially
liable third party, the defendant's right to use that deposition would be significantly more limited.
c. Increased likelihood of settlement
If the defendant impleads and exposes a culpable party to potential liability,
he likely could negotiate a more favorable settlement. After all, by joining a
party as an additional defendant, the original defendant likely would decrease
the amount the plaintiff would accept from him alone in a settlement. The defendant's proportionate share of any overall settlement would diminish correspondingly. By increasing the number of parties who might contribute to a
settlement, the defendant could increase the likelihood of amicable resolution.
d. Intangible benefits
Perhaps the most significant benefit of tendered-defendant impleader inuring to the defendant is intangible. If the plaintiff is particularly sympathetic or
the defendant appears to have deep pockets, a jury may be psychologically reluctant to embrace the defendant's "he-did-it" defense. After all, to do so would
send the plaintiff away from the courthouse with nothing. Rather than use that
defense, the defendant would be better off creating a strategic pifiata by tendering to the plaintiff the potentially liable third party. The defendant then could
point to that third party and accuse: "He did it, not I." This approach would
offer the jury an alternative party to thrash for the sympathetic plaintiff's
benefit.
These benefits potentially accruing to the defendant are of course contingent upon the tendered party remaining in the lawsuit. If the plaintiff chose not
to sue the tendered third party in his orginal lawsuit, and if the plaintiff still
refused to proceed against that party after the direct tender, 46 arguably the tendered third party could move to dismiss the unpursued tendered claim. 47 Because of this potential situation, rule 14 could either allow the defendant to
oppose any dispositive motion on behalf of the plaintiff or require that the court
and the remaining litigants treat the dismissed third party as a de facto party to
the litigation. 4 8
45. Id. 32(a)(2). It is likely that the defendant and the third-party defendant would be "adverse" within the meaning of rule 32(a)(2) even though the defendant cannot recover directly from

the third-party defendant.
46. For a discussion of this issue, see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
47. The third party could file either a rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, a rule 56 motion for summary judgment, or a rule 41(b) motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. If the plaintiff did not
oppose such a motion, the court likely would grant it unless the court permitted the defendant to
submit opposition on behalf of the reluctant plaintiff.
48. Presumably, it is in the public interest for courts to protect a defendant's ability to employ
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2. When the Plaintiff Fails to Sue a Potentially Liable Third Party
Even if there is an incentive for the defendant to implead a third party on a
nonderivative theory of liability, there is another practical prerequisite to the
meaningful application of tendered-defendant practice-namely, that the plain-

tiff has not already sued the potential third-party defendant directly on the tendered claim. If the plaintiff has sued a potential third party directly for the
tendered claim, tendering would be inconsequential and irrelevant. 49
Although many factors may discourage a plaintiff from directly suing a potentially liable party, the following three are most apparent: (1) the plaintiff is
unaware of the potentially liable party and thus has not considered bringing suit;
(2) the plaintiff knows about the party, has considered bringing suit, but has
chosen not to; and (3) the plaintiff would like to sue the potentially liable party,

but cannot do so for some technical reason such as the lack of personal jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction.
a.

Plaintiff is unaware of a potentially liable party

If the plaintiff has not sued a potential party because she is unaware that the

party may be liable, tendered-defendant practice superficially appears to be useful; the defendant could implead the third party and tender that party directly to

the unknowing plaintiff. From a practical standpoint, however, this procedure
seems unnecessary. If ignorance is the only reason the plaintiff has failed to sue
a third party, the problem could be solved simply through education. After
learning about the potential defendant, the plaintiff in most cases could amend
her complaint under rule 15 to add the third party as a defendant. 50

There may be some situations, however, in which a plaintiff could not
amend her complaint, thus apparently making direct tender a meaningful op-

tion. For example, the court in its discretion might decline to grant the plaintendered-defendant practice meaningfully. Protecting the defendant's interests would not only be
equitable, but it would also preserve the incentive for defendants to invoke this judicially economical
practice.
49. Besides, rule 13(g)-not rule 14-governs satellite claims among codefendants. Rule 13(g)
provides as follows:
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is
asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the
action against the cross-claimant.
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
If the plaintiff has sued a defendant on one claim but not on the tendered claim, however,
tendering a codefendant could be useful. For example, if the plaintiff has sued defendants A and B
on claim X, but has sued only defendant A on claim Y, it might be useful for defendant A to tender
defendant B to the plaintiff on claim Y. For this reason, if rule 14 is amended to include a tendereddefendant provision in civil cases, then rule 13(g) should likewise be amended to include a tendered
codefendant provision.
Even if rule 14 is not so amended, it would seem sensible for rule 13(g) to include a tendered
codefendant provision for admiralty cases. But this would be duplicative,' rule 14(c) does not have
rule 14(a)'s "a person not a party" limitation. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (emphasis added). Thus, admiralty defendants already can tender codefendants under rule 14(c). See supra note 25.
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (governing amended and supplemental pleadings).
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tiff's motion to amend to add the new defendant; the defendant's option to
tender a third party directly to the plaintiff, however, presumably would be a

matter of right.51 Also, a statute of limitations conceivably could bar the plain-

tiff's claim against the third party by the time the plaintiff learns of the claim. If

so, it is possible, albeit doubtful, that the defendant's right to tender the third
52
party directly to the plaintiff would not be time barred.

b. Plaintiff has chosen not to sue a potentially liable party

Although plaintiffs often sue everyone imaginable, it is not uncommon for a
plaintiff to decline to proceed against a potentially liable party. For example, a
plaintiff may choose not to sue someone in order to preserve an otherwise lucra-

tive or amicable relationship, or to try to protect someone for whom the plaintiff
otherwise feels sympathy. Tendered-defendant impleader allows the sacrificial
defendant to implead the plaintiff's "friend" and then tender him to the reluctant plaintiff. This practice would subject the third-party "friend" to the same
potential liability as the original defendant.5 3
c.

Plaintiff cannot sue the third party

The final situation in which tendered-defendant impleader may be significant is when the plaintiff initially cannot sue the third party because of a lack of
personal or subject-matter jurisdiction.
(1) Lack of personaljurisdiction5 4
Through rule 14(c)'s tendered-defendant provision, one court has permitted
51. But if the jurisdictional basis for the tendered claim is supplemental (and if tendered claims
can still qualify for supplemental jurisdiction after Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989),
see infra notes 98-103 & 180-201 and accompanying text), the court always could exercise its discretion not to accept supplemental jurisdiction over the tendered claim. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 618-19 (1988) (discussing discretionary element of supplemental
jurisdiction); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) ("pendent jurisidiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right"); see also Binder v. Southeastern Historic
Restoration, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 620, 624 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (court exercised discretion to decline
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over pendent party); Mahoney v. National Org. for Women,
681 F. Supp. 129, 136 (D. Conn. 1987) (court noted that supplemental jurisdiction "is a doctrine of
judicial discretion, not of plaintiff's right"). If the jurisdictional basis is independent, however, the
court then would be required, absent some other ground for dismissal, to hear the tendered claim.
Cf. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (federal
courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation.., to exercise the jurisdiction given [to] them").
52. See supra note 7. The defendant's right to tender a third party to the plaintiff, despite the
fact that the plaintiff's resulting claim otherwise would be time barred, may be more compelling if
the plaintiff filed suit against the original defendant before the statute of limitations expired. Then,
the tendered third-party claim arguably "relates back" to the date of filing. See FED. R. Civ. P.
15(c). While this proposition is unsettled, it is doubtful. See supra note 7.
53. If the plaintiff refuses to pursue her "friend" even after the defendant's tender, at the very
least res judicata should bar the plaintiff's right subsequently to prosecute the tendered claim. See
infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
54. While this Article characterizes the present issue as one of "lack of personal jurisdiction," a
more accurate characterization would be "inability to serve process." The United States presumably
has personal jurisdiction over all persons within its territorial boundaries. Cf Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 722 (1877) (every sovereign possesses "sovereignty over persons ... within its
territory"), overruled in part, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1976). Only rule 4 of the Federal
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a plaintiff to recover damages from a third party over whom the court could not
otherwise exercise personal jurisdiction. In that case, Spearing v. Manhattan Oil
TransportationCorp., 5 the plaintiff sued Hudson Tank Storage Company (Hud-

son) as an original defendant. Although Hudson was "not amenable to the
court's personal jurisdiction" as an originally-named defendant,56 it was subject

to the court's personal jurisdiction "in its capacity as a named third-party defendant."'57 On this basis, the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed to judgment
against Hudson.5 8 Justifying this disposition, the court stated:
Under Rule 4(f) process is effective to give the court personal jurisdiction over a purported third-party defendant served within 100 miles of

the court house but outside the forum state's boundaries if such thirdparty defendant was one over59whom the "bulge" state has chosen to
exercise personal jurisdiction.

Although for all practical purposes Hudson was a true defendant as a result of
the direct tender, it was technically a third-party defendant for the purpose of
personal jurisdiction. 6° This scenario could recur, albeit infrequently, in any

civil case brought in federal court.
(2) Lack of subject-matterjurisdiction
In some instances, a plaintiff is unable to sue a potentially liable third party

in federal court because of the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tendereddefendant practice might provide a means to overcome this jurisdictional impediment. For example, such a situation could arise when the plaintiff's claim
against the potentially liable third party is grounded solely in state law and com-

plete diversity does not exist. A tendered-defendant impleader provision might
allow the defendant to join that third party, assert supplemental jurisdiction
61
over the claim, and then tender the party to the plaintiff for judgment.
Were tendered-defendant practice to be used in this manner, however, it

62
would raise serious jurisdictional questions unrelated to the rules of practice.
Rules of Civil Procedure limits the exercise of this sovereign power by procedurally restricting the
scope of service of process. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1063, at 225 (1987) ("The primary function of rule 4 is to
provide the mechanism for bringing notice of the commencement of an action to defendant's
attention and to provide a ritual that marks the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the lawsuit.").
55. 375 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
56. Id. at 771.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (footnote omitted).
60. See also Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 829, 831 n.* (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (service of third-party summons and complaint within 100 miles of the United States Courthouse in the Southern District of New York valid pursuant to Rule 4(f)).
61. This is a jurisdictional beehive. For a discussion of the impropriety of this approach, see
infra notes 123-201 and accompanying text.
62. "Practice" considerations would be significant in this situation if Congress or the courts
were to make the standard for applying supplemental jurisdiction to tendered claims coextensive
with the procedural standard for invoking the practice. Then, a judicial determination that the
Federal Rules permit a tendered claim would be a de facto determination that federal jurisdiction
supports it. Cf.FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a) (a determination that a counterclaim is "compulsory" is a de
facto determination that federal ancillary jurisdiction supports it). Such a jurisdictional/procedural
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If there is no basis for federal jurisdiction over a tendered claim, it is irrelevant
whether a tendered-defendant provision would sanction it procedurally. 63 After
all, a mere rule of procedure cannot create subject matter jurisdiction." 4 Part III
of this Article addresses this and other jurisdictional issues in greater detail. 65
B. Policy Benefits of Tendered-DefendantImpleader
When tendered-defendant practice is meaningfully applicable, its use substantially furthers several policy objectives underlying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. First, all of the joinder provisions of the Federal Rules, including
those governing cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, claim joinder,
and party joinder, 66 were designed to "enable the disposition of a whole controversy ... at one time and in one action." 67 Liberal joinder helps to eliminate
circuity of action, 68 multiple litigation, 69 and occasional inconsistent judgments
by providing a single federal forum in which courts can dispose of multiple

claims against multiple parties in a single civil action. 70 The United States
Supreme Court has summed up these purposes succinctly: "Under the Rules,
the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consis-

tent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is
strongly encouraged. ' 71 Tendered-defendant third-party practice clearly furthers these goals.
framework would obviously be sensible, efficient, and would more consistently implement important
congressional goals. Considering the Supreme Court's opinion in Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
2003 (1989), any impetus for such a change would have to come from Congress-not from the
Supreme Court or the lower federal courts.
63. Whether tendered claims fall within the federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction is uncertain after Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2003. Arguably they should. See infra notes 123-201 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 82 ("Th[e] [Federal] [R]ules shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts .... "); see also Newman-Green, Inc. v.
Alfonzo-Larrain, 109 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (1989) (Kennedy, L, dissenting) (citing rule 82).
65. See infra notes 91-206 and accompanying text.
66. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (cross-claims); id. 13(a) & (b) (counterclaims); id. 14 (third party
claims); id. 18 (claim joinder); id. 20 (party joinder).
67. United States v. American Sur. Co., 25 F. Supp. 700, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
68. See, eg., CCMS Publishing Co. v. Dooley-Maloof, Inc., 645 F.2d 33, 38 (10th Cir. 1981)
(rule 13); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rule 14), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Colton v. Swain, 527 F.2d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1975) (rule 14); Somportex Ltd.
v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,439 n.6 (3d Cir. 1971) (rule 14), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1017 (1972); LASA Per L'Industria del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143,
146 (6th Cir. 1969) (rules 13 & 14); Noland Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 301 F.2d 43, 50 (4th
Cir. 1962) (rule 14); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1959) (rule 14); American Export
Lines v. Revel, 262 F.2d 122, 124 (4th Cir. 1958) (rule 14); United States v. Merchants Matrix Cut
Syndicate, 219 F.2d 90, 95 (7th Cir. 1955) (rule 13); United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709, 712 (10th
Cir. 1954) (rule 14); Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great N. Ry., 201 F.2d 408, 415 (8th Cir. 1953)
(rule 14); Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1952) (rules 13 & 14);
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Saunders, 159 F.2d 481, 484 (4th Cir. 1947) (rule 14).
69. Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1977) (rule 13);
Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (rule 13);
Merchants Matrix Cut Syndicate, 219 F.2d at 95 (rule 13).
70. E.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 556 (1951) (joinder rules "intended to
facilitate.., the trial of multiple claims which otherwise would be triable only in separate proceedings") (rule 14).

71. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
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Second, an important purpose of the Federal Rules is to encourage settlement; by providing for liberal joinder and discovery, the Rules "enable the...
sides to agree on the facts and issues, settle more cases, and reduce the number
of issues and length of trials."'72 Because universal tendered-defendant impleader would permit joinder of all potentially culpable parties, it can diminish
each defendant's proportionate share of any gross settlement acceptable to the
plaintiff. Furthermore, by joining all of the relevant actors for discovery, pretrial motion practice, and settlement negotiations, all parties could better assess
their potential exposure or recovery. These factors could increase substantially
the likelihood of settlement.
Finally, a civil tendered-defendant provision would help to eliminate the
potential for abuse of the Rules' current indemnity impleader provision. 73 The
current Rules do not permit a civil defendant to implead a putative solely liable
third party. Thus, a defendant who wishes to do so must implead such a party
for contribution as an allegedJoint tortfeasor, 74 and then at trial argue that the
third party is solely liable. If the factfinder agrees, the ruse is successful: the

defendant isexonerated and the plaintiff recovers nothing from him (or from the
third party defendant). A tendered-defendant impleader rule would remove any
need to resort such an artifice.
Thus, while tendered-defendant impleader furthers the litigation interests of
plaintiffs and defendants (at the expense of tendered defendants), it has more
important consequences. It encourages the compromise and settlement of litigation, it promotes efficient judicial dispute resolution when settlement is impossible, and it eliminates the incentive to distort the Federal Rules.
III.

POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF EMPLOYING TENDERED-DEFENDANT
PRACTICE

Although tendered-defendant practice furthers important policy objectives
of the Federal Rules, its unavailability in civil-actions is largely due to purported
problems associated with its application. The two problems most often perceived to exist are: (1) that tendered-defendant provisions are inconsequential
because they cannot force plaintiffs to proceed unwillingly against tendered parties, and (2) that tendered-defendant claims often lack federal subject-matter jurisdiction. This Part addresses these perceptions, evaluates whether they are
well founded, and considers whether they justify restricting tendered-defendant
practice exclusively to maritime cases.
A.

The Reluctant PlaintiffProblem: Compelling the Plaintiffto Pursue a
Tendered Third Party

When tendered-defendant impleader was available in all civil actions,
courts generally held that "the plaintiff [did not need to] amend his complaint to
72. W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY
73. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
74. See supra notes 2 & 36 and accompanying text.

SYSTEM 234
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state a claim against [a] third party if he [did] not wish to do so." 7'5 As a result,

the tendered-defendant provision of rule 14 apparently seemed toothless to
courts

76

and commentators. 77 Indeed, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee

felt that this problem rendered pre-1946 tendered defendant practice inconsequential: "[tendered-defendant] impleader... amounts to no more than a mere
offer of a party to the plaintiff, and if he rejects it, the attempt is time-consuming

futility." 78 Partly because of this perception, the Advisory Committee recommended the 1946 amendment that eliminated tendered-defendant impleader in

civil actions. Presumably, this perception is to some extent responsible for the
continued unavailability of the practice in nonadmiralty actions.
It is undoubtedly true that a court cannot compel a plaintiff to prosecute a
claim that she does not wish to pursue. Nevertheless, this cannot justify the

universal unavailability of tendered-defendant practice in nonadmiralty cases.
In the first place, this issue arises only if a plaintiff actually chooses not to pursue
a tendered defendant. 79 Surely, when a plaintiff does want (or at least is willing)
to proceed against a tendered third party, the Rules should not preclude her
from doing so. At most, this argument suggests that in some instances tendering

may be futile. But, it does not justify the general unavailability of the practice in
civil actions.8 0
More significantly, however, this argument is simply wrong. In a legal
sense, courts can compel reluctant plaintiffs to pursue tendered claims against

third parties or else suffer adverse consequences. Present rule 14(c) states that
once a defendant tenders a third party to the plaintiff, "the action shall proceed
as if the plaintiff had commenced it against the third-party defendant." 8 1 This

rule is mandatory; because the action "shall" proceed as if the plaintiff commenced it against the tendered party, the plaintiff must pursue that party in the
same manner as she would pursue any other defendant. And although rule

14(c) does not expressly provide for sanctions against a noncomplying plaintiff,
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 14 advisory committee's note to the 1946 amendment (citing Carbola
Chem. Co. v. Trundle, 3 F.R.D. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Connelly v. Bender, 36 F. Supp. 368 (E.D.
Mich. 1941); Whitmire v. Partin, 2 F.R.D. 83 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); Satink v. Holland Township, 31 F.
Supp. 229 (D.N.J. 1940); Crim v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715 (D.D.C. 1939)).
76. See, e-g., Delano v. Ives, 40 F. Supp. 672, 673 (E.D. Pa. 1941) ("the weight of authority is
to the effect that a defendant cannot compel the plaintiff, who has sued him, to sue also a third party
whom he does not wish to sue, by tendering in a third party complaint the third party as an additional defendant directly liable to the plaintiff").
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 14 advisory committee's note to 1946 amendment.
78. Id.
79. This problem is unlikely to arise often. Tendered-defendant practice has long existed in
maritime cases, see ADMIRALTY RULE 56 (repealed 1966); FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c) (1966 amendment
retaining tendered-defendant practice in admiralty cases), and the "reluctant plaintiff" problem has
not overwhelmed admiralty courts. In all of the reported rule 14(c) tendering cases, no plaintiff has
declined to pursue a tendered third party. For reasons why a plaintiff might choose to forgo pursuing a tendered third party, see supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
80. Moreover, this problem does not seem any more compelling in the civil context than in the
admiralty context. Thus, it cannot justify the markedly different approaches to tendered-defendant
impleader of current rules 14(a) and 14(c). See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (nonadmiralty third-party
practice); id. 14(c) (admiralty third-party practice). Furthermore, rule 13 allows permissive counterclaims even though some hypothetical defendants might decline to employ the available procedure.
See id. 13(b).
81. Id. 14(c) (emphasis added).
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an implied sanction exists that is similar to the implied sanction under rule

13(a).
Rule 13(a) provides that a defendant "shall state as a counterclaim any

claim... aris[ing] out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the [plaintiff's] claim."'8 2 A defendant who fails to plead a compulsory counterclaim is precluded from asserting it in a subsequent action.8 3 This proposi84

tion is well settled even though rule 13 does not expressly mention preclusion.

After all, a penalty for noncompliance is essential to further rule 13(a)'s goal of
-promoting judicial economy;8 5 otherwise, the "compulsory" aspect of a "compulsory counterclaim" would be meaningless. A similar penalty presumably ex-

ists in the tendered-defendant context; otherwise, rule 14(c)'s mandatory
language, which is also intended to promote judicial economy, would be mean-

ingless.8 6 Thus, a plaintiff who refuses to pursue a tendered third party should
be precluded from doing so in a subsequent action.8 7 Such a penalty would
82. Id. 13(a) (emphasis added).
83. Although it is clear that the defendant cannot later pursue an unasserted compulsory counterclaim, the doctrinal basis underlying this bar remains unsettled. See Dindo v. Whitney, 451 F.2d
1, 3 (lst Cir. 1971). Some courts suggest that the defendant's subsequent action is precluded by the
doctrines of res judicata, merger, and bar. E.g., Dragor ShippingCorp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 378
F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1967); Local Union No. 11 Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. G.P. Thompson Elec.,
Inc., 363 F.2d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1966); Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d
631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961); Union Paving Co. v. Downer Corp., 276 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1960);

United States v. Eastport S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d 795, 805 (2d Cir. 1958); Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin,
207 F.2d 483, 488 (7th Cir. 1953); see Scott, CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1,
26-27-(1942); Developments in the Law, ResJudicata,65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 832 (1952). See generally 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1417, at 95 (1971) (discussing alternative theories that
support barring a later action for failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim); FEDERAL PROCEDURE LAWYERS' EDITION § 62:215, at 361 (1984) (listing the various characterizations of the bar
arising under rule 13(a)). Other courts, however, have prevented subsequent actions under the theories of waiver or estoppel. E.g., Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir.
1979); Cleckner v. Republic Van & Storage Co., 556 F.2d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 1977); Dindo,451 F.2d
at 3; see Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern Pleading,38 MINN.
L. REV. 423,428-36 (1954); Note, The Erie DoctrineandFederalRule13(a), 46 MINN. L. REV. 913,
920-21 (1962). But cf. Howell, Counterclaimsand Cross-Complaints in California, 10 S.CAL. L.
REV. 415, 454-58 (1937) (discussing courts' more strict application of waiver to counterclaims than
to joinder and impleader). See generally 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1417, at 96 (same);
FEDERAL PROCEDURE LAWYERS' EDITION § 62:215, at 361 (1984) (same).
Although the issue remains unsettled, "the trend of decisions concerning preclusion appears to
be moving from reliance upon strict res judicata theory to factual waiver or estoppel theory." Kennedy, CounterclaimsUnder FederalRule 13, 11 Hous. L. REv. 255, 260 (1974). Most commentators have looked favorably upon this trend. See id.; 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1417, at
96-97.
84. See Cleckner, 556 F.2d at 769 n.3 (discussing the absence of an express rule 13(a) penalty
for failure to bring a compulsory counterclaim). Although the preliminary draft of the counterclaim
rule expressly called for preclusion, the Advisory Committee deleted this provision from subsequent
drafts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (preliminary draft of May 1936) ("If the action proceeds to judgment
without such claim being set up, the claim shall be barred."). Nevertheless, the Committee's notes to
the final draft of rule 13 included this deleted language. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13 advisory committee's note ("If the action proceeds to judgment without the interposition of a counterclaim as required by subdivision (a) of this rule, the counterclaim is barred.").
85. For an overview of the policy underlying rule 13(a), see FEDERAL PROCEDURE LAWYERS'
EDITION § 62:206 (1984).
86. For a discussion of the policies underlying tendered-defendant practice, see supranotes 6674 and accompanying text.
87. It is unclear whether the doctrine of res judicata or the doctrine of estoppel or waiver would
underlie this preclusion; no courts have addressed the issue in the context of present rule 14(c).
Although estoppel is becoming the preferred preclusion doctrine in the context of unasserted rule
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promote judicial economy by preventing multiple lawsuits arising out of related
events. With such a penalty, courts could resolve tendered claims definitively
regardless of the plaintiff's chosen course of action.

Notwithstanding the finality that would be engendered by a preclusion penalty, the plaintiff's failure to pursue a tendered third party could effectively deny
the defendant the benefits that led him to utilize direct-tender practice in the first
place. 8s Considering this, defendants might generally be discouraged from

tendering third parties at all. The Rules could, however, reduce this disincentive. For example, if a court were to dismiss a tendered defendant because of the

plaintiff's failure to prosecute, the Rules could permit the original defendant to
employ the rules of discovery and evidence as if the tendered defendant were still
a party to the suit. Alternatively, the Rules could permit the defendant to step
in and pursue the plaintiff's tendered claim on the plaintiff's behalf. The defendant (as surrogate plaintiff) then formally could oppose any dispositive motions filed by the third party, whether such motions were based on a failure to
prosecute or on any other ground.8 9 Such provisions largely would preserve and
maximize the defendant's incentive to utilize tendered-defendant practice.
For these reasons, the Advisory Committee's draconian approach (eliminating civil tendered-de'endant practice altogether) to this minor problem was
unjustified; because plaintiffs rarely decline to proceed against tendered third

parties, and because the Rules imply adequate remedies that compel compliance
and preserve the benefits of the practice, tendered-defendant impleader is rarely,
if ever, a "time-consuming" exercise in "futility." 90 Thus, the "reluctant plain-

tiff" issue should not stand in the way of resurrecting tendered-defendant impleader in all civil actions.
B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Tendered-Defendant Claims
Third-party claims, like all actions brought in federal court, must fall
13(a) counterclaims, see supra note 83, the more compelling doctrine of res judicata arguably should
apply to unasserted tendered claims.
Estoppel is preferred in the counterclaim context partly out of mercy for unwilling defendants
whom the plaintiff has hailed into court. Estoppel can "extricat[e] ...defendant[s] who ha[ve] ...
[un]knowingly refrained from asserting [a][counter]claim." 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2,
§ 1417, at 96-97. Moreover, estoppel is a "more flexible tool" to protect such defendants from the
harsh effects res judicata would have in the cases of default judgment, consent judgment, or dismissals after settlement. Id. at 97.
However, there are no reasons why the Rules should afford a plaintiffsuch quarter. It is the
plaintiff who intitiates litigation. And if the plaintiff fails to play by the rules of tendered-defendant
practice, it is the plaintiff who should suffer the consequences of res judicata. Therefore, when a
plaintiff declines to pursue a tendered claim, resjudicata should merge her unasserted claim into any
final judgment, thus forever barring her from suing the previously-tendered third party on the tendered claim.
88. See supra notes 37-48.
89. The defendant (as surrogate plaintiff) ultimately could proceed against the third party at
trial and then, if successful, recover costs incurred (including a reasonable attorney's fee) in putting
on the plaintiff's case for her. Alternatively, if the defendant pursues the tendered party in order to
preserve the benefits of tendering, the Rules could prevent the plaintiff from recovering any judgment that the court might enter against the third party in favor of the plaintiff.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 14 advisory committee's note to 1946 amendment.
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within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. 9 1 Because rule 14 cannot provide
subject-matter jurisdiction, 92 an independent or supplemental basis of jurisdiction must exist before any third-party claim (indemnity or tendered-defendant)
is cognizable in federal court. In recommending the abolition of civil tendereddefendant impleader in 1946, the Advisory Committee sought to eliminate
problems arising from this "jurisdictional limitation. ' 93 This is presumably the
second major reason why tendered-defendant practice remains unavailable in
nonadmiralty civil actions.
1. Jurisdictional Analysis of Tendered-Defendant Claims
Traditionally, indemnity third-party claims have not required an exacting
jurisdictional analysis. 94 Defendants in the vast majority of cases theoretically
could base federal jurisdiction over an indemnity claim on diversity, 95 federal
question, 96 admiralty, 97 or any other independent basis of federal jurisdiction.
91. See, e.g., Mollett v. Penrod Drilling Co., 872 F.2d 1221, 1227 (5th Cir. 1989) (court labors

to find subject matter jurisdiction over third-party claim); Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp.,

317 F. Supp. 829, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (tendered-defendant third-party claims must be supported by
federal jurisdiction); 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1444, at 215.
92. See, eg., Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be expanded by the Federal Rules"); see also Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 808
(2d Cir. 1959) ("But Rule 14 does not extend jurisdiction. It merely sanctions an impleader procedure ...."); FED. R. Civ. P. 82 ("These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein."). See generally 6 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 2, § 1444, at 217-18 (discussing basis of ancillary jurisdiction).
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14 advisory committee's note to the 1946 amendment. The Committee
stated:
[I]n any case where the plaintiff could not have joined the third party originally because of
jurisdictional limitations such as lack of diversity of citizenship, the majority view is that
any attempt by the plaintiff to amend his complaint and assert a claim against the impleaded third party would be unavailing.... For th[is] reaso[n] therefore, the words "or to
the plaintiff" in the first sentence of subdivision (a) have been removed by the amendment
Id.
94. This is true for both rule 14(a) and rule 14(c) indemnity claims. There are no practical or
jurisdictional differences between an indemnity claim brought under rule 14(a), and an indemnity
claim brought under rule 14(c). See supra notes 4 & 24 and accompanying text. Under either rule,
the original defendant impleads the third party alleging that the third party should be liable to the
original defendant if the court finds the original defendant liable to the original plaintiff. The relationship between the parties, and the nature of the actions are identical. But see McCann v. Falgout
Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968). The McCann court erroneously treated rule 14(c) and rule
14(a) indemnity claims differently for jurisdictional purposes, refusing to apply ancillary jurisdiction
to defendant's rule 14(c) third-party claim when, under then-existing supplemental jurisdiction doctrine, ancillary jurisdiction would have applied to an identical rule 14(a) indemnity claim.
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); Molett, 872 F.2d at 1227; Oroco Marine, Inc. v. National
Marine Serv., 71 F.R.D. 220, 223 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982); see In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 570 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(court had subject-matter jurisdiction over rule 14(c) indemnity claim "arising under the laws of the
United States").
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). Section 1333 provides as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases
all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
(2) Any prize brought into the United States and all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as prize.
Id. Numerous courts have found admiralty jurisdiction over third-party indemnity claims. See
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Nevertheless, such independent bases of federal jurisdiction never have been necessary. Prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Finley v. United States,98 once

courts determined that an indemnity claim arose out of the same common nucleus of operative facts as the anchor claim and was logically related to that
claim, 99 ancillary federal jurisdiction attached. Because indemnity third-party

claims necessarily arise out of the "same transaction or occurrence" as the
anchor claim,100 this two-pronged test was "always" satisfied when joinder was
procedurally proper. I01 While Finley renders this conclusion less certain, 10 2 it
Parker v. Gulf City Fisheries, Inc., 803 F.2d 828, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1986); Harrison v. Flota Mercante
Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968, 987 (5th Cir. 1978); Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d
100, 118 (5th Cir. 1970); Tri-State Oil Tool Indus. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178, 186
(5th Cir. 1969); Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 570; Tatlow & Pledger (PTY) Ltd. v. Hermann Forwarding
Co., 456 F. Supp. 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cantey v. Flensburger Dampfercompagnie Harald
Schuldt & Co., 55 F.R.D. 127, 128-29 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
98. 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
99. E.g., Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926); Revere Copper &
Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1970); Northern Contracting
Co. v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 621, 623-24 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
100. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a); id. 14(c) (indemnity impleader provision containing "same transaction [or] occurrence" standard as rule 14(a) and, in addition, a more liberal "series of transactions
or occurrences" provision).
101. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978) (indemnity claim asserted
by defendant against a third party "always is" ancillary); see also Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626
F.2d 293, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1980) (indemnity or contribution claim by defendant against third-party
defendant is within ancillary jurisdiction of federal courts); Rogers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,

601 F.2d 840, 843 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979) (federal court may assert jurisdiction over subrogation claims
by defendant against nondiverse impleaded third-party defendant); May's Family Centers, Inc. v.
Goodman's, Inc., 104 F.R.D. 112, 113-16 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (indemnity claim is ancillary because of
common factual basis with, and logical dependence on, original complaint); Ahern v. Gaussoin, 104
F.R.D. 37, 40-41 (D. Or. 1984) (contribution claim is ancillary where impleader is proper); Kotsonis
v. Superior Motor Express, 539 F. Supp. 642, 646 (M.D.N.C. 1982) (third-party complaint seeking
indemnity or contribution is ancillary to principal action); Curtis v. Radiation Dynamics, Inc., 515
F. Supp. 1176, 1178-79 (D. Md. 1981) (ancillary jurisdiction present because third party action
dependent on original action for its disposition); Nynaes Petroleum AB v. Transworld O11, Ltd.,
1981 A.M.C. 675, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (ancillary jurisdiction justified by "same core of facts" underlying the admiralty claim and the third-party claims for indemnity and lost profits); Tatlow &
Pledger (PTY), Ltd. v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 456 F. Supp. 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (claim for
indemnity or contribution within court's ancillary jurisdiction); Northern Contracting Co. v. C.J.
Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 621, 624 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (third-party complaint claiming
indemnity or contribution is ancillary to main action); In re Albert & Maguire Secs. Co., 70 F.R.D.
361, 363 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (third-party complaint for indemnity or contribution does not require
independent basis of jurisdiction). But see Hartford Accident & Indem, Co. v. Sullivan, 846 F.2d
377, 382 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (majority rejects proposition that "any 14(a) claim is within the
ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts").
102. Under Finley's restrictive approach to supplemental jurisdiction, indemnity third-party
claims may no longer be permissible unless supported by an independent basis of federal subjectmatter jurisdiction. Said the Finley majority, "with respect to the addition of parties, as opposed to
the addition of only claims" the Court will "not assume that the full constitutional power has been
congressionally authorized." Finley, 109 S.Ct. at 2007. Thus, the Court will not extend supplemental jurisdiction to claims against "addition[al] ...parties" unless a specific statute authorizes it. Id.
Although no statute specifically extends ancillary jurisdiction to cover indemnity claims against
additional parties, surely the Finley Court did not intend to disturb the well-settled rule that ancillary supplemental jurisdiction covers indemnity claims. Nevertheless, the Court failed to include
this application of ancillary jurisdiction as one of the "narrow" exceptions to its new restrictive
approach. See id. at 2008. Under the Court-recognized "ancillary" exception, supplemental jurisdiction is permissible despite the lack of statutory authorization only if the "ancillary" party has a
claim "upon contested assets within the court's exclusive control," or if his presence is "necessary to
give effect to the court's judgment." Id. Neither is the case in typical indemnity and contribution
impleader. The justification for permitting factually related third-party claims is merely to "'con-
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likely remains true. 10 3 For this reason, a jurisdictional analysis of indemnity
third-party claims for all practical purposes begins and ends with the joinder

rule.
In contrast, tendered-defendant claims require a more thoughtful and deliberate jurisdictional analysis. 10 4 To understand why, one must take an elementary look at how courts approach and analyze subject-matter jurisdiction issues.

When determining whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists over a claim,
federal courts scrutinize the claim of the party seeking to recover. In traditional

indemnity impleader, the defendant seeks to recover from the third party. To
this end, the defendant petitions the court for an order compelling the third
party to pay him, because he has paid, or may be liable to pay, the plaintiff. 10 5

Thus, there is no question that an indemnity claim is the defendant's. Upon
determining that the claim arises out of the same "nucleus of operative facts" as
plaintiff's claim against that defendant, 10 6 courts have always found supporting

ancillary jurisdiction.
Tendered-defendant claims, however, are fundamentally different and
therefore compel a distinct analysis. Through tendering, the defendant does not
seek to recover from the third party on the tendered claim. 10 7 Rather, the defendant petitions the court for an order compelling the third party to pay the

plaintiff directly.' 0 8 Here lies the analytical problem: it is unclear whose

veniene ... the litigants,'" and to further" 'judicial economy.'" Id. (quoting Kroger, 437 U.S. at
376-77). Considering this, the relationship between an indemnity claim and an anchor claim is arguably one of" 'mere factual similarity,'" which cannot "'justify [the] extension of the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376-77).
For these reasons, the viability of ancillary jurisdiction over indemnity third-party claims is
uncertain after Finley. Indeed, less than a month after the Court handed down Finley, one lower
court eloquently presaged its possible effect on third-party practice: "Congress' silence on ancillary
jurisdiction, and Justice Scalia's sweeping language in Finley arguably sound the death knell for
ancillary jurisdiction in this context." Community Coffee Co. v. M/S KRITI AMETHYST, 715 F.
Supp. 772, 773 (E.D. La. 1989) (Beer, J.). Noting that "ancillary jurisdiction may no longer cover
Rule 14(a) indemnity and contribution claims," Judge Beer opined that third-party ancillary jurisdiction "may have been caught in the wide swath Finley cut into supplemental jurisdiction. While
the Finley majority may well have intended to address specifically the pendent party jurisdiction
problem, the opinion's sweeping language is undeniable. Thus, its effect on supplemental jurisdiction
in general is potentially far-reaching." Id. at 774. But see Huberman v. Duane Fellows, Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("This court does not share the doubts of the Community Coffee court
and does not read Finley as threatening jurisdiction over impleaded third-party defendants."); Lingo
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., No. CV-85-2789 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
database) ("Finley does not say that it has abolished all ancillary or pendent party jurisdiction

103. For a discussion of Finley, see infra notes 180-201 and accompanying text.
104. On this point, the critics of tendered-defendant practice are correct. For reasons explained
later, however, hypothetical jurisdictional problems cannot justify the universal unavailability of the
practice. See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
105. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) & (c) (indemnity impleader provision).
106. Of course, this analysis is purely academic. Courts reflexively permit indemnity impleader
because ancillary jurisdiction almost always covers indemnity claims. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376.
But see Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008 (Court failed to include indemnity claims among permissible
ancillary claims); Community Coffee Co., 714 F. Supp. at 774 (ancillary jurisdiction may not include
Rule 14(a) indemnity and contribution claims); supra note 102 (uncertainty of exercising ancillary
jurisdiction over third-party indemnity claims). Thus, courts rarely go through this pedestrian jurisdictional analysis. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
108. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
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"claim" the federal court should scrutinize when determining whether subjectmatter jurisdiction supports a tendered-defendant claim. Should the court consider the defendant's third-party "claim" against the impleaded party? Or,
should the court consider the plaintiff's resulting "claim" against the tendered
third-party defendant? Competing considerations cloud this issue.
On the one hand, the original defendant has no substantive "claim" against
the third party whom he brings into the case. Because he has no right to recover
from the third party, the defendant can demand only that the court render judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In this light, only the original plaintiff has a substantive right to recover from the third party, and arguably, only the plaintiff has
a claim against the third-party defendant.

On the other hand, despite the plaintiff's possible "claim" against the third
party, the plaintiff does not "assert" the claim against that third party-at least
in the first instance. The plaintiff clearly does not "assert" any right of action.
The original defendant asserts the plaintiff's right on the plaintiff's behalf.
Unfortunately, the courts in rule 14(c) tendering cases have yet to articulate
clearly which claim is jurisdictionally significant. Furthermore, most courts
have failed even to recognize that the issue exists. The vast majority simply have
evaluated tendered-defendant impleader as if it were identical to indemnity impleader without discussion or analysis. These courts have blindly considered
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists vis-A-vis the defendant and the tendered third party, without even acknowledging an alternative analytical
possibility.10 9
Although this majority approach to tendered-defendant jurisdiction is convenient, it is somewhat illogical; in theory, courts more likely should evaluate
jurisdiction vis-i-vis the plaintiff and the tendered third party. First, in the context of existing rule 14(c), the language itself provides that once the original
defendant initiates a tendered-defendant claim, "the action shall proceed as if
the plaintiffhad commenced it against the third party defendant." 110 Hence the
rule postures the claim against the third party as if the plaintiff "had commenced it."' 1 Indeed, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee in 1946 analogized the tendered-claim situation to that existing when the "plaintiff. . .
' 112
amend[s] his complaint [to] assert a claim against the impleaded third party.
Second, even though the plaintiff technically does not "assert" the tendered-defendant claim against the third party, the plaintiff alone posesses the
substantive right to recover. The defendant has no such right. Thus, it is the
109. E.g., In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489 F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1974) (court ponders
whether jurisdiction exists, but does not distinguish tendered-defendant impleader from indemnity
impleader); Stinson v. S.S. Kenneth McKay, 360 F. Supp. 674, 675 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (Noel, J.);
McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34, 41-42 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (Noel, 3.).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c) (emphasis added). Presumably, any general civil tendered-defendant
provision adopted would have a similar provision.
111. Id.
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 14 advisory committee's note to the 1946 amendment. It is remarkable
that so few admiralty courts have recognized this seemingly obvious point in the rule 14(c) context.
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'1 13
And only a
plaintiff-not the defendant-who is the "real party in interest."
"real party in interest" can pursue a claim in federal court.1 14

For these reasons, the better jurisdictional analysis would be for courts to
examine the jurisdictional grounds for the plaintiff's resulting claim against the
tendered third party. In short, for jurisdictional purposes courts should treat
the tendered defendant as a newly joined defendant-not as a traditional third
party. Under this approach, the resulting jurisdictional problems are akin to
those associated with the joinder of additional defendants.
The remainder of this Part discusses and evaluates whether court should
treat tendered defendants like newly joined defendants when evaluating jurisdiction. To this end, it considers which bases of federal jurisdiction (independent
and supplemental) might properly support the plaintiff's resulting claim against
a tendered third party.
2.

Analysis Applied to Independent Bases of Jurisdiction

Often an independent basis of jurisdiction will exist vis-a-vis the plaintiff
and tendered third party. Indeed, rule 14(c) tendered-defendant claims are usually supported by an independent basis of federal jurisdiction; 115 while courts

tendered-defendant
are often silent as to the jurisdictional basis for rule 14(c)
1 17
or appears to be, 118
claims, 116 in most cases independent jurisdiction is,
grounded in admiralty.1 19 Thus, in most tendered-defendant cases now arising
under rule 14(c), the plaintiff's resulting action against the tendered third party
would be cognizable in federal court regardless of the nature of the anchor

claim.
Similarly, if the Federal Rules expanded the applicability of tendered-de-

fendant practice to include all civil actions, an independent basis of jurisdiction
likely would support most tendered claims. In those cases in which the tendered
113. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a); see also Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.,
630 F.2d 250, 256-58 (5th Cir. 1980) (real party in interest possesses the right sought to be enforced);
Mason-Rust v. Laborers' Int'l Union, Local 42, 435 F.2d 939, 943-44 (8th Cir. 1970) (court defined
real party in interest as party who suffered injury originally, despite reimbursement for the injury).
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70, at
452 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing concept of real party in interest as one of three concepts to be considered for joinder of parties in federal courts).
115. See, e.g., Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd. v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., 826 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1987);
Frota Oceanica Brasileira, S.A. v. M/V Alice St. Philip, 790 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1986); Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. M/V Gloria, 767 F.2d 229, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Oil Spill by Amoco
Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1983); Riverway Co. v. Trumbull River Servs., 674 F.2d 1146,
1154-55 (7th Cir. 1982); see also, eg., In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489 F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir.
1974) (maritime nature of claims furnished independent jurisdictional basis).
116. See, eg., Coastal (Bermuda)Ltd., 826 F.2d at 427; Frota OceanicaBrasileira,S.A., 790 F.2d
at 417; PacificEmployers Ins. Co., 767 F.2d at 242-43; Riverway Co., 674 F.2d at 1154-55.
117. See, e.g., Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d at 914; In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489 F.2d
at 154.
118. See, eg., Coastal (Bermuda)Ltd., 826 F.2d at 424; Frota OceanicaBrasileira,S.A., 790 F.2d
at 417; PacificEmployers Ins. Co., 767 F.2d at 242-43; Riverway Co., 674 F.2d at 1154-55.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982) (conferring admiralty jurisdiction). No cases are reported in which
a nonadmiralty independent basis of federal jurisdiction supports a rule 14(c) tendered-defendant
claim.
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claim presents a federal question,12 0 or whenever all nonfederal-question defendants, 12 1 including the tendered defendant, are of diverse citizenship from all of

the plaintiffs,' 22 an independent basis of jurisdiction would support the plaintiff's tendered-defendant claim. Thus, even assuming that supplemental jurisdiction could never apply in tendered-defendant cases, it is unjustifiable to deny

the direct-tender option simply because in a hypothetical minority of cases, the
courts might have to dismiss tendered-defendant claims for the lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.
3.

Analysis Applied to Supplemental Bases of Federal Jurisdiction

When a plaintiff's tendered claim against a third party lacks an independ-

ent basis of jurisdiction, courts must consider whether a supplemental basis of
jurisdiction can support the properly joined claim or whether the claim must be

dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because tendered-defendant
practice furthers judicial economy and encourages settlement, supplemental ju-

risdiction arguably should attach to all tendered claims, just as it attaches to

123
cross-claims, compulsory counterclaims, and indemnity third-party claims.

But, unfortunately, under current doctrine supplemental jurisdiction might not
attach. The Supreme Court's 1978 opinion in Owen Equipment & Erection Co.
v. Kroger,124 and its opinion last term in Finley v. United States, 125 may foreclose
the applicability of supplemental jurisdiction to tendered-defendant claims.
The term "supplemental jurisdiction" is a general term that correlates the
three separate but related concepts of pendent, ancillary, and pendent party ju120. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). The citizenship of afederalquestion tendered party is irrelevant; even if the plaintiff's anchor claim is based on diversity jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction can support the plaintiff's tendered claim against nondiverse parties. Moreover, the presence of

such a nondiverse tendered party does not defeat jurisdiction over other state law claims against
diverse defendants. This is true despite the fact that the tendered party's citizenship would seem to
defeat the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
See, eg., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Powell v. Offshore
Navigation, Inc., 644 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (Randall, J.) (discussing and applying
Romero); see also Brown v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 753 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1985) (complete
diversity not destroyed by nondiverse defendant over whom there exists an independent basis of
federal question jurisdiction); Thibodeau v. Foremost Ins. Co., 605 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
(same). See generally 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3605, at 400 (1984 & Supp. 1989) ("Of course, the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss does not
require dismissal of claims against nondiverse defendants if the plaintiff has an independent basis of
[federal question] jurisdiction over them.") (citations omitted). This rule applies only to "federal
question" defendants; it does not apply to "admiralty" defendants. See infra note 121.
121. This includes "admiralty defendants" before the court under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). An
"admiralty defendant" is technically not a "federal question defendant." See Powell, 644 F.2d at
1068. Thus, such a defendant's presence can defeat complete diversity jurisdiction over state law
claims against other defendants. Id. at 1071.
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); see also Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267 (requiring
complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants).
123. Like cross-claims, compulsory counterclaims, and indemnity third-party claims, tendereddefendant claims necessarily arise out of the same operative facts as the anchor claim. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 14(c). Presumably a "transaction or occurrence" requirement would also be carried over
into any civil practice tendered-defendant provision.
124. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
125. 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).

1990]

DIRECT-TENDER PRACTICE

risdiction 1 26 Although courts 12 7 and commentators1 28 have recognized the
marked similarity of the doctrines, they remain analytically distinct bases of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. A pendent jurisdiction situation traditionally
occurs when a plaintiff asserts against the defendant additional nonfederal
claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative fact as the federal claim for
which she is suing the defendant. 129 A pendent party situation also deals with
nonfederal claims asserted in a predominately federal question/admiralty action. 130 Unlike pendent jurisdiction, however, pendent party claims are asserted

against, and require the joining of, additional nonfederal-question defendants.
Pendent party jurisdiction thus involves a plaintiff's claim against one party that
126. See generally Freer, A PrincipledStatutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987
DUKE L.J. 34, 34 (1987) (discussing confusion regarding supplemental jurisdiction and suggesting a

principled approach to the question of statutory authorization of supplemental jurisdiction). All of
these supplemental bases ofjurisdiction have a discretionary element. That is, even if a court has the
power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim, it may in its discretion decline to do so if
there are counterveiling considerations of "judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity."
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 618-19 (1988) (discussing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 715);
see also Miller v. Griffin-Alexander Drilling Co., 873 F.2d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 1989) (court has discretion to deny jurisdiction over state law claims and may refuse to extend pendent-party jurisdiction).
This discussion does not address the discretionary element of supplemental jurisdiction. Rather, it
considers only the scope of the federal courts' power to entertain such claims.
127. Prior to Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989), the Supreme Court discussed the
similarity of the doctrines. Freer, supra note 126, at 34 n.1 (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 n.8 (1978) (recognizing that ancillary and pendent jurisdiction stem from
the same problem) and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (finding "little profit in attempting to decide.., whether there are any 'principled' differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction")). But the Finley majority rejected the opportunity to assimilate these separate bases of
supplemental jurisdiction into a unified doctrine. Indeed, because the Court flatly rejected the pendent party jurisdiction doctrine but not the ancillary and pendent jurisdiction doctrines, 109 S. Ct. at
2008-10, the distinction among the three is now more important than ever. See infra text accompanying note 134.
128. Freer, supra note 126, at 34 n.1 (citing Matastar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction
Primer The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 150-57
(1983); Note, A Closer Look at Pendent andAncillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory ofIncidental
Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935, 1937 (1982); Note, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REv. 1263, 1271-87 (1975); see also Note, Unravelling the 'PendentParty' Controversy: A Revisionist Approach to Pendent andAncillary Jurisdiction,
64 B.U.L. REV. 895, 900 (1985) (discussing the difference between pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction).
129. Freer, supra note 126, at 34 n.1 (citing J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 2.14, at 77-78 (1985); Matasar, supra note 128, at 117-18); see also Baylis v. Marriott
Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 665 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law
claim).
,130. The doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction is pertinent only in federal question and admiralty actions; it is essentially inapplicable in diversity actions because of the aggregation of claims
rule and the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
The plaintiff in a diversity action can seek judgment against a third party only if there exists an
independent basis of federal jurisdiction (either federal question, admiralty, or complete diversity)
over that claim. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978). There
are at least two procedural circumstances in which this issue could arise: (1) when the diversity
plaintiff amends her complaint to seek judgment against a third party, or (2) when the defendant
directly tenders a third party to the plaintiff and demands judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Under
the present Federal Rules, the second scenario never could arise in a diversity case; rule 14(c)'s
tendering provision is applicable only when the anchor claim is based on federal admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h); see supranote 12 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, if the
Federal Rules were amended to permit tendered-defendant impleader in all civil cases, the resulting
diversity jurisdictional issues would be no more problematic than those that now arise in Kroger
situations (that is, when the plaintiff amends her complaint to sue a third-party defendant directly).
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lacks an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, but that arises out of the same

nucleus of operative facts as the plaintiff's federal-question or admiralty claim
against a different party.13 1 Ancillary jurisdiction potentially encompasses
claim or party joinder instituted by any party or nonparty other than the original plaintiff against a party named in her complaint. 132 It is "mainly a tool for
defendants and third parties whose interests would be injured if their jurisdictionally insufficient claims could not be heard in an ongoing action in federal
court." 133 Courts and commentators regularly employ these terms rather than
the more generic term "supplemental jurisdiction."
Because Finley arguably buried the pendent party doctrine, the distinction
between these three subcategories of supplemental jurisdiction has become abso-

lutely critical.1 34 This distinction is especially crucial in tendered-defendant
practice. 135 Obviously pendent jurisdiction plays no role in tendered-defendant

practice; the posture of a tendered claim is not that of a nonfederal claim as-

serted by a plaintiff against an original defendant. But both ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction are potentially implicated in tendered-defendant
impleader. Which of these two doctrines courts should apply, however, and the

consequences of that choice, are less certain. To understand these issues more
fully, it is necessary to analyze supplemental jurisdiction both in the diversity
136
and nondiversity anchor claim contexts.

131. See Baylis, 843 F.2d at 664. See generally Currie,Pendent Parties,45 U. CHI. L. REV. 753,
753-55 (1978) (discussing whether pendent jurisdiction in federal question cases extends to
nonfederal claims against additional defendants); Annotation, Pendent Jurisdictionof FederalCourt
Over State Claim Against PartyNot Otherwise Subject to FederalJurisdiction Where State Claim is
Sought to be Joined With Claim Arising Under Laws, Treaties,or Constitutionof United States ("Pendent Party" Jurisdiction), 72 A.L.R. FED. 191, 197-98 (1985 & Supp. 1987) (discussing pendent
party jurisdiction).
132. See Freer, supra note 126, at 34-35.
133. Baylis, 843 F.2d at 663; see also Freer, supra note 126, at 34 n.1.
134. Conceivably, had the courts never recognized a distinction between pendent party and
other types of supplemental jurisdiction, the issue addressed in Finley never would have arisen.
135. The distinction is crucial, not only as it now exists in admiralty, but also as it might exist if
tendered defendant practice were adopted in civil practice generally.
136. A few commentators have addressed supplemental jurisdiction issues in the context of admiralty tendered-defendant practice under rule 14(c). See, e.g., Landers, By Sleight of Rule: Admiralty Unification and Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 51 TEX. L. REV. 50 (1972); Comment,
Ancillary Jurisdictionin Admiralty: Smooth Sailingfor Impleading ofNon-Maritime Causes of Action, 17 INTER-AM. L. REV. 275 (1986) [hereinafter Smooth Sailing]; Comment, Third-PartyPractice in Admiralty: Ancillary Jurisdiction, 28 Sw. L.J. 1021 (1974) [hereinafter Admiralty Ancillary
Jurisdiction];Note, Impleader of Nonmaritime Claims Under Rule 14(c), 47 TEX. L. REV. 120
(1968) [hereinafter Nonmaritime Claims]; Comment, Pendent Jurisdictionin Admiralty, 1973 Wis.
L. REv.594 [hereinafter Pendent Jurisdiction]; Comment, supra note 4; Note, Pendent Jurisdiction

in Admiralty, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1211 (1972) [hereinafter Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty],
These commentators, however, have not only failed to elucidate the problems adequately, but they
also have become mired in irrelevant and confusing accessory issues. See Briggs v. Town of Brewster, 1989 A.M.C. 752, 756 (D. Mass. 1988). For example, the problem whether to extend the right
toajury trial in a third-party claim should not affect subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Whether a jury
trial is appropriate is jurisdictionally irrelevant. Cf. Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2018
n.24 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the irrelevance of accessory issues to a federal jurisdiction analysis).
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Supplemental jurisdiction when the anchor claim is based on
diversity jurisdiction

Since 1946, rule 14 has not permitted tendered-defendant impleader when
the plaintiff's anchor claim is based on diversity jurisdiction. 137 Still, if the
Rules did permit it, there would be no jurisdictional problem if the original defendant and tendered defendant were both diverse from the plaintiff (and the
claim[s] against each defendant exceeded $50,000); an independent basis of diversity jurisdiction would support the tendered claim. In the absence of complete diversity, however, a supplemental basis of jurisdiction would be necessary
to salvage the tendered claim. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger 13 8 may foreclose this possibility.
A tendered-defendant rule only procedurally permits a plaintiff's claim
against a tendered third-party defendant-it does not grant subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. 13 9 Thus, if one assumes that courts should analyze jurisdiction over tendered-defendant claims vis-i-vis the plaintiff and the third party,
then tendered-defendant cases appear to present supplemental jurisdiction
problems analogous to those arising when a plaintiff either brings such a claim
under rule 14(a) 140 or amends her complaint under rule 15 to add such a
claim. 141 In Kroger the Court squarely addressed this jurisdictional issue in the
diversity anchor-claim context. There, the plaintiff sued the original defendant
for a state law claim falling within the court's diversity jurisdiction. The original
defendant then impleaded for indemnity or contribution a third party who was
not diverse from the plaintiff. Later, the plaintiff voluntarily amended her complaint to assert a direct claim against the nondiverse third party.
The Kroger Court found no independent jurisdictional grounds to support
the plaintiff's newly added claim against the third party; federal question jurisdiction was unavailable because the plaintiff's claim was based on state law, and
diversity jurisdiction was unavailable because the third party was a citizen of the
same state as the plaintiff.1 42 More significantly, however, the Kroger Court
found no supplemental basis of jurisdiction to support the plaintiff's claim
against the third party. Dismissing that claim for lack of jurisdiction, the Court
held that the diversity jurisdiction statute14 3 does not confer supplemental juris137. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c) (providing for tendered-defendant impleader in rule 9(h)
admiralty cases) with id. rule 14(a) (not providing for tendered-defendant impleader in general civil

actions). Because tendered-defendant impleader is unavailable in diversity cases, the supplemental
jurisdiction issues that might arise in that context are purely hypothetical.
138. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
139. See FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein.").

140. Id. 14(a). Rule 14(a) provides that "[t]heplaintiffmay assert any claim against the thirdparty defendant arising out of the same transaction or occurrence." Id. (emphasis added).
141. For a discussion of why courts should approach tendered-defendant jurisdictional issues
vis-i-vis the third-party defendant and the plaintiff, see supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
142. Kroger,437 U.S. at 373-76. The district court had summarily dismissed the original diverse
defendant, making Kroger even more problematic. This dismissal in effect left two citizens bf the
same state as the only litigants in a purely state law case.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982).
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diction 1 " over a plaintiff's claim against nondiverse third parties.14 5
One can make a strong argument that the Court decided Kroger wrongly.
The Kroger majority based its holding entirely on the perceived absence of congressional authorization for jurisdiction. It reasoned that to allow ancillary jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claim against a nondiverse third party
would be to skirt the long-existing complete diversity requirement, which the
Court-not Congress-devised in 1806.146 Even if the complete diversity re-

quirement is a sensible interpretation of the diversity jurisdiction statute,147 extending ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff's newly-added claim against an
existing rule 14(a) third party would not diminish any congressional goals. Considering the preference that both Congress and the courts have consistently
shown for promoting judicial economy and encouraging settlement,' 48 the
Court's reluctance to extend supplemental jurisdiction to a plaintiff's claim
against an existing third party seems squarely contrary to any discernible congressional intent. 149
Nevertheless, Kroger is the law. And the Rehnquist Court appears unwilling to reconsider it anytime soon. Indeed, the Court's decision last term in Finley v. United States 150 suggests that, if anything, the Court is more likely to
entrench its anti-supplemental jurisdiction position than to retreat from it.
Although Kroger is the law, its relevance in the tendered-defendant context
is uncertain. Because tendered-defendant impleader has not been procedurally
available in civil cases since 1946, no modem court has considered whether Kroger would preclude the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's
nonfederal claims against a nondiverse tendered third party. Nonetheless, if the
relationship between the plaintiff and the tendered defendant is the jurisdictionally relevant one (as seems logically appropriate's 1), then Kroger strongly suggests that supplemental jurisdiction would be unavailable in the diversity anchor
claim context. If so, and if the Rules were amended to permit tendered-defendant practice in civil cases, Congress should correct Kroger's contrived limitation
on supplemental jurisdiction, at least in the tendered-defendant context. After
all, this restriction disserves widely recognized goals of federal practice while
furthering none.
144. The court employed the term "ancillary" jurisdiction rather than "supplemental" jurisdiction. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373-76.
145. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373-74; see also Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2007-08 (discussing Kroger).
146. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
148. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
149. For an extensive argument that the Court's Kroger decision was unprincipled and unjustifi-

ably limited the application of supplemental jurisdiction, see Freer, supra note 126 at 67-77.

150. 109 S.Ct. 2003 (1989). This Article discusses Finley in more detail below. See infra notes
180-201 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
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Supplemental jurisdiction when the anchor claim is based on federal
question or admiralty jurisdiction.

152
Tendered-defendant impleader has long existed in admiralty procedure.

Thus, maritime third-party practice provides a useful analytical framework
within which to discuss supplemental jurisdiction issues that could arise if the
Rules were amended to permit tendered claims in general federal question cases.

Prior to the 1966 unification of admiralty and civil practice, admiralty actions were wholly distinct from civil actions. Federal courts entertained only

civil claims on the "civil side" of the court (where the right to jury trial existed)
and only admiralty claims on the "admiralty side." Although it was unclear

whether the reason was jurisdictional, procedural, or both, this wall was virtually impenetrable. Admiralty courts even refused to hear civil counterclaims that

civil courts would have considered to be compulsory.1 53 Likewise, admiralty
courts often categorically refused to hear nonadmiralty third-party claims-even
1 54
those having an independent basis of jurisdiction.

When the Federal Rules merged admiralty and civil practice in 1966, they
broke down this wall. The joinder provisions of the resulting Federal Rules now

apply to all cases and allow litigants to join nonadmiralty claims with admiralty
claims in a single action.
From a jurisdictional standpoint, when an independent basis ofjurisidiction
supports a nonadmiralty claim properly joined with an admiralty anchor claim,
no impediment exists to litigating both in federal court. Likewise, when a supplemental basis of jurisdiction supports a nonadmiralty claim properly joined
with an admiralty anchor claim, no jurisdictional impediment should exist.

Although this seems obvious, the fundamental applicability and scope of supplemental jurisdiction in postunification admiralty cases was initially uncertain.
The first postunification court to address this supplemental jurisdiction is-

sue held that ancillary jurisdiction could never extend to nonadmiralty third56
party claims in admiralty cases. 155 In that case, McCann v. FalgoutBoat Co.,'
Judge Noel of the Eastern District of Texas reasoned that because preunification
nonadmiralty claims could not be heard under supplemental jurisdiction, neither
57
could postunification nonadmiralty claims.'

152. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. Fort Morgan S.S. Co., 270 U.S. 253, 258-59 & n.1 (1926);
United Transp. & Lighterage Co. v. New York & Bait. Transp. Line, 185 F. 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1911);
The Yankee, 37 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); see also, e.g., Landers, supra note 136, at 62-63
(discussing the reluctance of admiralty courts to find jurisdiction over nonadmiralty claims).
154. Some admiralty courts declined to hear nonadmiralty claims on jurisdictional grounds.
Eg., Armour & Co., 270 U.S. at 259 n.1 (Brandeis, J.) (dictum); The Lake Galera, 60 F.2d 876, 880
(2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 670 (1933); Transmarine Corp. v. Fore River Coal Co., 28 F.2d
624, 625 (D. Mass. 1928), aff'd sub nom. Eastern Mass. Street Ry. v. Transmarine Corp., 42 F.2d 58
(Ist Cir. 1930); Capital Transp. Corp. v. Thelning, 167 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D.S.C. 1958); Warner v.
The Gas Boat Bear, 126 F. Supp. 529, 530 (D. Alaska 1955); see also Landers, supra note 136, at 6061 (arguing that a broader reading of Admiralty Rule 56 should have been employed by the courts).
155. See McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
156. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (Noel, J.).
157. Id. at 37-41. See generally Smooth Sailing,supra note 136, at 282-86.
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Since McCann, however, courts generally have found ancillary jurisdiction

available in admiralty cases to the same extent that it is available in civil
cases. 158 Only two reported decisions since McCann have dismissed third-party

claims for want of maritime1 59 or admiralty 160 jurisdiction, and only one opinion expressly has refused to apply ancillary jurisdiction to support a tendereddefendant claim in an admiralty case; that opinion, like McCann, was authored
by Judge Noel. 16 1 Because the vast majority of courts addressing the issue since
162
1966 have allowed tendered-defendant impleader under ancillary jurisdiction,

it now appears to be well settled that ancillary jurisdiction can support a plain16 3
tiff's direct claim against a tendered third party defendant in admiralty cases.
Thus, these decisions have implicitly rejected the pre-1946 view t 64 that ancillary
158. See generally Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Cmh
L. REV. 1 (1959) (analyzing the decision of Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354 (1959), and its impact on federal maritime jurisdiction); Landers, supra note 136, at 65
(proposing that federal jurisdiction is unitary and criticizing cases denying ancillary jurisdiction in
admiralty). Moreover, commentators have almost uniformly criticized the reasoning and result of
McCann. See Landers, supra note 136, at 67-69; Smooth Sailing, supra note 136, at 275; Admiralty:
Ancillary Jurisdiction, supra note 136, at 1030-33; Nonmaritime Claims, supra note 136, at 120-22;
Pendent Jurisdiction, supra note 136, at 602-03; Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty, supra note 136, at
1215-16; Note, supra note 4, at 1177-79.
159. Smith v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. Civ. A. 86-1432 (E.D. La. June 23, 1987)
(WESTLAW, FADM-CS database) (Schwartz, J.) (without discussing other possible bases of federal
jurisdiction, court dismissed the "'14(c) tender" for want of "maritime jurisdiction").
160. Bernard v. U.S. Lines, 475 F.2d 1134, 1136 (4th Cir. 1973).
161. See Stinson v. S.S. Kenneth McKay, 360 F. Supp. 674, 676 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (Noel, J.).
Recently, a district court declined to exercise ancillary jurisdiction in this context after discussing
Judge Noel's reasoning in McCann. See Briggs v. Town of Brewster, 1989 A.M.C. 752, 755-56 (D.
Mass. 1988). Whether that court relied specifically on McCann to reach this result is unclear. See
id. at 756.
162. See Joiner v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 677 F.2d 1035, 1041 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[W]e hold
that a third-party claim lacking independent grounds ofjuiisdiction may be appended to an admiralty action and is cognizable in federal court under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction so long as
the ancillary claim arises out of the same core of operative facts as the main admiralty action.");
Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[Tlhe constitutional
rationale which underlies the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of... Rule 14 may be
applied to support the conclusion that a federal court has the power to hear a related state claim
against a defendant not named in the federal claim regardless of whether the federal claim arises in
the civil or admiralty jurisdiction."); Harcrest Int'l, Ltd. v. M/V Zim Keelung, 681 F. Supp. 354,
357 (E.D. La. 1988) ("It is not necessary that this Court find an independent jurisdictional basis...

since Joinerclearly permits ancillary jurisdiction over a 14(c) impleader."); First Bank Southeast of
Kenosha, Wis. v. M/V Kalidas, 670 F. Supp. 1421, 1430-31 (E.D. Wis. 1987) ("The court has
ancillary jurisdiction over the nonadmiralty and nonmaritime claims... brought pursuant to Federal Rule[] of Civil Procedure 14(c)."); Trumble v. Packard, Inc., Civ. A. No. 84-3514 (E.D. La.
June 10, 1987) (WESTLAW, FADM-CS database) (court found "ancillary jurisdiction over [Rule
14(c)] claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence"); Gibbs v. S/S Dona Paz, 96 F.R.D.
599, 602 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Courts have construed Rule 14(c) as encouraging consolidated admiralty
proceedings, going so far as to hold that a federal court presiding over a maritime action may under
the principles of ancillary jurisdiction hear a related state claim against a person not named in the
federal claim but connected to the matter at issue."); Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Serv., 87 F.R.D.
353, 355-56 (E.D. La. 1980) ("I think the intent of the merger of the admiralty with the civil rules
was to allow ancillary jurisdiction in admiralty impleader under Rule 14(c), preserving the substitute
defendant practice unique to admiralty."); Fawcett v. Pacific Far E. Lines, 76 F.R.D. 519, 521 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (rule 14(c) claims "are cognizable under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction").
For an argument that Finley v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2003 (1989), completely abrogated the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the third-party practice context, see supra note 102.
163. Presumably, this would likewise be true in federal question cases if tendered-defendant impleader were permitted in that context.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17 & 153-54 and accompanying texts.
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jurisdiction does not attach to direct-tender claims. In so doing, they have further undercut this problem as a viable argument against pemitting tendereddefendant practice in all federal question cases.
Nevertheless, if one properly distinguishes the concepts of ancillary and
pendent-party jurisdiction, it is questionable whether courts should apply the
ancillaryjurisdiction doctrine in the tendered defendant context. 165 First, Kroger clearly reflects the Supreme Court's hostility toward applying ancillary jurisdiction to allow a plaintiff to recover from a party against whom he had no claim
based on an independent jurisdictional ground. Second, and more significantly,
the factual setting in direct-tender practice is virtually identical to that existing
in the classic pendent party context. 166 The plaintiff's resulting claim in a tendered-defendant action strikingly resembles a tag-along state claim brought in a
federal-question or admiralty action against a new defendant. Thus, the applicability of pendent party jurisdiction-not ancillary jurisdiction-in theory is
more properly at issue in the tendered-defendant context.
Only one commentator has approached recognition of this. In 1976, Professor David Robertson of the University of Texas briefly noted, "Because 'substitute defendant' third-party practice involves a functional tendering of the
third-party defendant to the original plaintiff, jurisdictional limits ought to be
congruent with those applicable to joinder of parties." 167 Although other commentators have discussed tendered-defendant jurisdictional issues, none has recognized that the problem concerns pendent party rather than ancillary
68

jurisdiction.'
Likewise, only one court has recognized that it should address a plaintiff's
tendered-defendant claim against a tendered third party as a pendent party juris165. Professor Moore also has concluded that ancillary jurisdiction should be unavailable in the
tendered-defendant context. Although his conclusion is likely correct, he bases his argument on
erroneous grounds. He states:
[I]n cases under Rule 14(c) where impleader is made on the ground that the third party is

liable directly to the plaintiff, and there is no diversity between the plaintiff and third-party
defendant or any independent federal jurisdiction of the claim, the validity of [applying
ancillary jurisdiction] is doubtful in light of the Supreme Court's holding in the Owen
Equipment case.
3 J. MOORE, supranote 2,
14.36, at 14-162 (citations omitted). But the limited statutory holding
of Krogerdoes not directly affect rule 14(c) tendered-defendant practice. The KrogerCourt based its
decision wholly on the statutory requirement of complete diversity of citizenship in federal diversity
actions. See Kroger,437 U.S. at 377; see also Freer, supra note 126, at 69-74. As the Federal Rules
are currently structured, there can be no rule 14(c) tendered-defendant claims in diversity cases; rule
14(c) applies only when the anchor claim is based on admiralty jurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ. P.
9(h); id. 14(a); id. 14(c). Therefore, Kroger's limited "complete diversity" holding does not directly
affect the applicability of ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff's rule 14(c) tendered-defendant claim.
166. See generally Currie, supra note 131, at 753-55 (discussing the necessary relationship of
claims before pendent jurisdiction may be invoked); Annotation, supra note 131, at 191 (collecting
and analyzing federal court cases discussing pendent party jurisdiction).
167. Robertson, supra note 10, at 1653-55. Professor Robertson goes on to suggest that "'substitute defendant practice may be broadened more successfully through pendent jurisdiction." Id. at
1654.
168. See Landers, supra note 136, at 67-69; Smooth Sailing, supra note 136, at 275; Admiralty:
Ancillary Jurisdiction,supra note 136, at 1030-33; Nonmaritime Claims, supra note 136, at 120-22;
Pendent Jurisdiction,supra note 136, at 602-03; PendentJurisdictionin Admiralty, supra note 136, at
1215-16; Note, supra note 4, at 1177-79.
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diction issue. 169 In In re Oil Spill By the Amoco Cadiz,170 French citizens sued
affiliates of Standard Oil Company for oil spill damages caused by the super-

tanker Amoco Cadiz when it foundered and sank off of the coast of France in
1978. Standard Oil then impleaded the shipbuilder, Astilleros Espanoles, under
rule 14(c) and tendered Astilleros to the plaintiffs. Noting that it was questionable whether the plaintiff's products liability claim against the third-party shipbuilder fell within admiralty jurisdiction, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit considered applying a supplemental basis of jurisdiction.
The court stated:
Since jurisdiction over [the plaintiffs'] claim against Amoco is incontestable, there probably is pendent jurisdiction over their claim against
Astilleros arising from the same transaction. Although many recent
decisions, including [a recent decision of this circuit] reject "pendent
party" jurisdiction as a basis for allowing a diversity plaintiff to bring
in an additional defendant against whom the plaintiff has a state law
claim that does not satisfy the minimum amount in controversy requirement of the diversity statute, the admiralty setting is
distinguishable. 171

Apparently the court would have applied pendent party jurisdiction to the plaintiffs' rule 14(c) claim against the shipbuilder. But the court's discussion of this
issue was dictum; it eventually found that the questionable claim fell within its
172
admiralty jurisdiction.
Before the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Finley v. United States,1 73 in
every circuit but one it was purely academic whether courts should characterize
a plaintiff's tendered claim as a pendent party or an ancillary claim. Either way,
most courts had jurisdiction. If improperly characterized as ancillary, tendered
claims fell within the federal courts' supplemental ancillary jurisdiction. 174 If
more properly characterized as pendent party claims, tendered claims usually
remained within the courts' supplemental-pendent party-jurisdiction. This
was so because every pre-Finley appeals court that considered the pendent party
jurisdiction doctrine, 175 except the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
169. One court has reached an opposite result. In Staffer v. Staten Island Hosp., 686 F. Supp.

400 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), Judge McLaughlin of the Eastern District of New York all but precluded the
use of pendent party analysis in tendered defendant situations. He opined that pendent party jurisdiction covers only "[a] pendent party [who] has been joined 'at the behest of the plaintiff to a
federal question case." Id. at 401 (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). A tendered
claim (which necessarily is joined at the behest of the defendant) could never raise pendent party
issues under Judge McLaughlin's restrictive approach to the doctrine.
170. 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).

171. Id. at 913-14 (referring to Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005, 1008-09 (7th Cir.
1982)) (other citations omitted).
172. Id. at 914. For a discussion of admiralty jurisdiction over such claims against shipbuilders,
see Wonacott, ProductsLiabilities of Shipbuilders and Repairers,62 TUL. L. REV. 465 (1988) (contribution to Admiralty Law Institute Symposium: ProductsLiability in Admiralty).

173. 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
174. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
175. See, eg., Miller v. Griffin-Alexander Drilling Co., 873 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1989); Feigler v.
Tidex, Inc., 826 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1987); First Ala. Bank v. Parsons Steel, Inc., rev'd, 474 U.S. 518
(1986); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1984); Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725

F.2d 645 (11th Cir. 1984); Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469
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Circuit, 176 had recognized that it was viable17 7-at least unless Congress clearly
had demonstrated an intent to exempt the pendent party from being haled into
federal court.1 78 Thus, prior to Finley, a tendered-defendant claim arising out of
the same nucleus of.operative fact as an admiralty anchor claim always qualified
U.S. 1018 (1984); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 818
(1983); North Dakota v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1980) (en bane);
F.D.I.C. v. Otero, 598 F.2d 627 (1st Cir. 1979); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d
800 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Miller v. Griffin-Alexander Drilling Co., 685 F. Supp. 960, 965-66 n.5
(W.D. La. 1988) ("[E]very circuit which has considered [pendent party jurisdiction], except the
Ninth, has extended the Gibbs rationale to pendent parties."), aff'd, 873 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1989);
Wicker v. First Fin. of La. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 673 F. Supp. 167, 169 n.2 (M.D. La. 1987) (listing
cases from each circuit, except the Ninth, recognizing courts' discretion in accepting pendent jurisdiction). See generally Currie,supra note 131, at 754 ("Most courts of appeals that have considered
the issue have had no difficulty extending Gibbs to cases in which an additional party not subject to
the federal claim is brought in to answer a state one."); Annotation, supra note 131, at 191 (collecting and analyzing federal court cases discussing "pendent party" jurisdiction).
176. See, ag., Carpenter's S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. D & L Camp Constr. Co., 738 F.2d 999, 1000
(9th Cir. 1984); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1977) (no pendent party
jurisdiction exists in FTCA cases) (principle ultimately embraced by Supreme Court in Finley, 109 S.

Ct. at 2009); see also Puget Sound Prod. Credit Ass'n v. O/S Bold Lady, 1985 A.M.C. 889, 890
(W.D. Wash. 1984) (court refused to apply pendent party jurisdiction in admiralty case) (citing
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982)). But see Princess Cruises Corp. v.
Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 762, 765 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (In an admiralty case, district
court opined that "pendent jurisdiction may be exercised even when it involves bringing in an additional party defendant.").
177. When a plantiff brought an anchor claim under federal admiraltyjurisdiction, many courts
were especially disposed to apply the pendent party jurisdiction doctrine. See, eg., National Resources Trading, Inc. v. Trans Freight Lines, 766 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Oil Spill by
Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909, 913-14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Leather's Best, Inc.,
451 F.2d at 811; Schexnider v. McDermott Int'l, 688 F. Supp. 234, 239 (W.D. La. 1988); Syndicate
420 at Lloyd's of London v. Glacier Gen. Assurance Co., 633 F. Supp. 428, 430-31 (E.D. La. 1986);
Lingo v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 638 F. Supp. 30, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Wood v. Standard
Prods. Co., 456 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (E.D. Va. 1978); see also PrincessCruises Corp., 373 F. Supp. at
763-65 (not finding admiralty jurisdiction, court held pendent jurisdiction existed "even when it
involves bringing in an additional party defendant."). For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized that "pendent-party-defendant jurisdiction [is more compelling] in the admiralty field, where there is a strong policy of consolidating as many claims as possible
in one forum." Bernstein, 738 F.2d at 187; see also Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d at 913-14
("The tradition of liberal joinder ... illustrates the strong admiralty policy in favor of providing
efficient procedures for resolving maritime disputes.").
Even the pre-Finley Supreme Court seemed to be inclined toward allowing pendent party jurisdiction when the anchor claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts (as many
admiralty claims do). See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (dicta). Because of the savings-to-suitors clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982), federal courts have concurrentjurisdiction with the
state courts over some admiralty claims, while they have exclusive jurisdiction over others. See
generally F. MARAIST, ADMIRALTY 10 (2d ed. 1988) ("savings to suitors" clause grants to state
courts "subject matter jurisdiction, concurrent with federal courts, over most maritime matters").
In circuits then recognizing pendent party jurisdiction only when the anchor claim fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, a seemingly anomalous situation could have arisen: rule
14(c) claims could have been supported by pendent party jurisdiction in exclusively federal admiralty
cases, but not in those "saved" to "suitors."
178. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17-18. In Aldinger the plaintiff asserted a civil rights claim under
section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871), against a county administrator
who had fired her. As the Supreme Court had up to then interpreted it, however, section 1983 did
not create a cause of action against municipalities. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961),
overruled, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, the plaintiff attempted
to end-run Monroe by joining a state law claim against the county under the court's pendent party
jurisdiction, despite the lack of an independent basis of jurisdiction. The Court expressly rejected
pendent party jurisdiction over this state law claim because, in the Court's view, section 1983
demonstrated Congress' clear intent to exclude municipalities from suit in federal court. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18-19.
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for supplemental jurisdiction-unless the case was pending in the Ninth CirCuit.1 79 Likewise, if tendered-defendant practice had been available in federal
question cases prior to Finley, tendered claims in those cases logically should
have received similar jurisdictional treatment.
But after Finley, the applicability of supplemental jurisdiction to such

claims is questionable. Finley considered whether supplemental jurisdiction extends in Federal Tort Claims Act 180 cases "to additional parties for whom an
independent base [of jurisdiction] ... is lacking." 181 After an elementary analysis of the constitutional and statutory sources of judicial power, 182 the Court

revisited its 1966 landmark decision in United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs.183 Gibbs was the Court's first decision under the Federal Rules to recognize the legitimacy of supplemental jurisdiction over claims that arise out of the
1 84
same "common nucleus of operative fact" as the jurisdiction-invoking claim.
Gibbs permitted such pendent claims among parties alreadyjoined in a federal
question action. The Finley Court concluded, however, that Gibbs did not necessarily grant federal courts the power to hear nonfederal claims againstpendent
parties. Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Scalia opined that "[w]ithout spe179. Thus, whether a pre-Finley court considered a plaintiff's tendered-defendant claim to fall
within its ancillary jurisdiction or within its pendent party jurisdiction was of practical significance
only in the Ninth Circuit. This practical significance is illustrated by Fawcett v. Pacific Far E. Lines,
76 F.R.D. 519 (N.D. Cal. 1977). In that case, a district court within the Ninth Circuit allowed a
plaintiff to assert nonfederal tendered-defendant claims against a third party defendant "under the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction." Id. at 521. The Fawcett court would have had to dismiss the rule
14(c) claim if the court had more properly characterized it as a pendent party claim, Cf. Puget
Sound, 1985 A.M.C. at 890 (Ninth Circuit does not sanction pendent party jurisdiction). Thus the
proper jurisdictional characterization of a tendered claim, at least in the Ninth Circuit, was crucial
not only from an academic standpoint, but from a practical one.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
181. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005. The Court granted certiorori in Finley to resolve a conflict
among the circuits on this issue. See Metheny v. Hamby, 109 S. Ct. 270, 271-72 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting from Court's denial of certiorori). In reality, this conflict was not one among the circuits,
but one between the Ninth Circuit and all others.
182. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005-06.
183. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
184. The Supreme Court first recognized supplemental jurisdiction in Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 450 (1861), when it permitted third-party claimants to property confiscated by the government to intervene in the proceedings, even though their claims to the property had no independent basis of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 460-61. The courts have since given Freeman limited
significance because if the Court had not recognized this supplemental "jurisdiction by necessity," it
would have denied the third-party intervenors due process; they effectively would have been denied
the opportunity to claim entitlement to the seized property. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 29 (4th ed. 1983). As one commentator has pointed out, however, due process
did not require this result; due process could have been satisfied, and supplemental jurisdiction
avoided, by dismissing the entire case under an indispensable party theory and allowing a state court
to try the entire case. See Freer, supra note 126, at 50.
In 1926, the Court expanded the pre-Federal Rules availability of supplemental jurisdiction.
That decision, Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926), recognized the legitimacy of
using supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims. Id. at 609. As Professor Freer
notes: "Although an attentive reading of Moore does not disclose a conscious desire to expand the
availability of supplemental jurisdiction, commentators and the lower courts have consistently read
the case as opening the door for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction justified by efficiency or convenience." Freer, supra note 126, at 51-52. Thus, with Moore as constitutional support, the lower
courts after 1938 liberally expanded the scope of supplemental jurisdiction ("common nucleus of
operative fact") to bring it and the new Federal Rules' joinder ("same transaction or occurrence")
principles into close alignment. Id. at 52-53.
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cific examination of jurisdictional statutes," Gibbs extended federal judicial

power over a civil "action" to its full constitutional limit.18 5 This, according to
the Finley Court, was a "departure"-a departure that the Court said it did not
intend to "limit or impair," but a departure that, at least in the Federal Tort
18s 6
Claims Act context, it "would not... exten[d] to the pendent-party field."
Finley's effect on tendered-defendant claims remains to be seen. 187 If the

lower federal courts interpret Finley as an absolute, universal ban on pendent
party jurisdiction, 188 then (again assuming that it is the plaintiff's relationship
with the tendered defendant that is jurisdictionally significant) Finley apparently

forecloses tendered-defendant practice in all admiralty or federal question actions when the tendered claim is not supported by an independent basis of jurisdiction. But of course this would be the case only if courts properly characterize
tendered claims as presenting pendent party issues. Those courts improperly

characterizing tendered defendant claims as ancillary (presumably because they
consider tendered claims jurisdictionally identical to indemnity claims) probably

would continue to have jurisdiction over all properly joined tendered claims aris-

ing 9ut of the same operative facts as the anchor claim. 189 Given the important
practical and policy advantages of liberal tendered-defendant practice, this approach, even if analytically questionable, might be a preferable alternative to

employing the hostile approach to supplemental jurisdiction apparently mandated by Finley.190
Nevertheless, if courts consider that tendered-defendant cases present pen-

dent party issues, Finley's effect on tendered defendant impleader could be minimized in any of several ways. First, lower courts could distinguish and sharply

limit Finley's holding. For example, if courts restricted Finley to Federal Tort
185. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2006.
186. Id. at 2010.
187. More fundamentally, its effect on pendent party claims in general remains to be seen.
188. See Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878 F.2d 638, 643 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989). Considering the
sweeping language used by Justice Scalia, this interpretation is not unreasonable: "All our casesZahn, Aldinger, and Kroger-have held that a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving particular
parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different parties. Our
decision today reaffirms that interpretive rule." Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010. Furthermore, the analytical approach to pendent party jurisdiction that the Finley Court prescribes is heavily weighted
against pendent party jurisdiction. Finley requires courts to interpret jurisdictional statutes narrowly
against pendent party jurisdiction. Thus, unless Congress expressly states otherwise, courts probably
should not allow pendent party jurisdiction. See id. at 2007 ("we ... will not read jurisdictional
statutes broadly"); see also id. at 2011 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This approach is significantly
more restrictive than that taken by the Court in Aldinger. Under an Aldinger analysis, jurisdictional
statutes presumptively allowed pendent party jurisdiction unless "Congress has demonstrated an intent to exempt 'the party as to whom jurisdiction pendent to the principal claim' is asserted from
being haled into federal court." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16); see
also Binder v. Southeastern Historic Restoration, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 620, 623 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (court
applied Aldinger and evaluated whether Congress had "negate[d] the existence of pendent party
jurisdiction" over securities law claims). See generally Bruce v. Martin, 724 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (discussing different rules of statutory interpretation prescribed by Aldinger and Finley).
189. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
190. This assumes that ancillary jurisdiction, at least in the indemnity impleader context, remains viable and has not "been caught in the wide swath Finley cut into supplemental jurisdiction."
Community Coffee Co. v. M/S Kriti Amethyst, 715 F. Supp. 772, 774 (E.D. La. 1989); see supra
note 102.
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Claims Act cases, 191 it would affect only pendent party jurisdiction in tort suits
against the United States. Thus, in the tendered-defendant context, it would
limit only the United States' right to implead and tender third parties. Such an
interpretation would leave intact the substantial body of circuit court case law
recognizing pendent party jurisdiction under other, non-FTCA jurisdictional
provisions such as those governing general federal question jurisdiction 92 and
93
admiralty jurisdiction.
Despite this possible limiting interpretation, it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court or the lower courts will interpret Finley narrowly. Not only is Justice
Scalia's language and approach to supplemental jurisdiction antagonistic, but his
rule of statutory interpretation is unusually exacting.19 4 Furthermore, considering that Federal Tort Claims Act cases fall within the federal courts' exclusive
jurisdiction, Finley was a most attractive case for the Court to permit pendent
party jurisdiction if it harbored any inclination to do so. 195 Perhaps the only
chance is that courts will be reluctant to apply literally Justice Scalia's rigid
language against applying supplemental jurisdiction to joined claims against new
parties. After all, to do so likely
would invalidate ancillary jurisdiction even in
96
indemnity impleader cases. 1
Second, Finley obviously would be irrelevant if the Court overruled it. Indeed, a persuasive argument can be made that Finley's "unnecessarily grudging"' 197 approach to supplemental jurisdiction was statutorily and
constitutionally unwarranted, as well as inefficient and counterproductive. 198
Why a closely divided Court saw fit in Kroger and Finley to undermine important policy principles that both it and Congress have embraced-principles of
judicial economy and settlement promotion-is mysterious, especially considering that those cases had little political or ideological significance. To hold that
"neither the convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can
191. Perhaps Finley merely establishes a "complete FrCA" requirement for 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1982). This "complete FrCA" requirement might be roughly analogous to the Strawbridge-established "complete diversity" requirement for 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 200810; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). Similarly, Finley arguably prohibits
pendent party jurisdiction only under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), just as Aldinger prohibits pendent
party jurisdiction only under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3-4) (1982), or as Kroger prohibits supplemental
jurisdiction only under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). Thus, the lower courts are not necessarily bound

by Finley in analyzing whether the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), and the
admiralty jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982), permit pendent party jurisdiction.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982).
194. See supra note 185-86.
195. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
196. See Huberman v. Duane Fellows, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("This court will
not disavow years of impleader practice until clear signals are heard from courts above."). But see
Community Coffee Co. v. M/T Kriti Amethyst, 715 F. Supp. 772, 774 (ED. La. 1989) (district
court apparently embraced Justice Scalia's sweeping language); supra note 102.
197. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2023 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See, eg., Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2011-23 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, J.J.). Many of Professor Freer's comments on the
Court's flawed jurisdictional analysis in Krogerand Aldinger apply equally well to Finley. See Freer,
supra note 126, at 61-77.
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suffice to justify" the extension of supplemental jurisdiction199 when nothing
meaningful is gained by taking that view is an unprincipled approach. Indeed, it
is an approach apparently founded on a separation of powers theory gleaned
from a high school civics textbook. 2°° Nonetheless, reversal seems unlikely in
the near future, especially considering that the Finley Court announced its position with unusually unequivocal and absolute language-albeit by a one-vote
majority.
Third, regardless of whether the Court's statutory interpretation was correct, Congress could accept the Finley Court's entreaty and legislate in the area
of supplemental jurisdiction. The Court's hint in this regard was less than
subtle:
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by
a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress. What is of
paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a
background of clear interpretive
rules, so that it may know the effect of
20 1
the language it adopts.
The enactment of a broad supplemental jurisdiction statute-one encompassing
the contemporary doctrines of ancillary, pendent, and pendent party jurisdiction-clearly would be the preferable means to liberalize Finley's restrictive approach. Not only would such congressional authorization appease the Finley
majority, but it also would provide definitive assurance that federal courts have
the power efficiently to resolve all properly joined factually related claims in a
single federal question or admiralty lawsuit.
4. The Jurisdictional "Problem" in Perspective
This discussion to a certain extent substantiates that there is some jurisdictional complexity associated with tendered-defendant impleader. In light of
Kroger and Finley, this complexity is particularly evident when the tendered
claim lacks an independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction. But any such
problems are relatively insignificant and do not outweigh the practical and policy advantages of permitting tendered-defendant practice in all civil cases.
Why jurisdictional issues have stood as a longstanding barrier to liberal
tendered-defendant practice is unclear. Jurisdictional concerns have not
plagued other liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules. Indeed, at least
two current joinder rules contemplate an independent basis of jurisdiciton to
support the joined claim. Rule 13(b) permits a defendant to join a counterclaim
against a plaintiff even though his claim does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim. 20 2 Because suppleniental jurisdiction
can never attach to such claims, rule 13(b) requires an independent basis ofjuris199. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008 (quoting Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377).
200. For similar opinions reflecting Justice Scalia's overriding concern with separation of powers
issues, see Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 675-83 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting alone);
Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2622-41 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States ex rel.

Vuitton, 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2141-47 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

201. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
202. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) ("A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an
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diction to give it effect. 20 3 Similarly, rule 18(a) permits a party asserting any
'20 4
claim to join "as many claims ... as the party has against an opposing party.
Such claims can be entirely unrelated to the principal action and, as a result, in
many cases must be supported by an independent basis of jurisdiction. 20 5 But,
that rule 18(a) and rule 13(b) claims sometimes require an independent basis of
jurisdiction has not prompted the repeal of those rules' liberal joinder provisions.
Likewise, that tendered claims sometimes may require an independent basis of
jurisdiction alone cannot justify the continued unavailability of tendered-defendant practice in civil actions.
Moreover, any jurisdictional problems that may arise in the tendered-defendant context are not insurmountable. This is clearly demonstrated by current
rule 14(c). Although rule 14(c) long has permitted tendered-defendant practice
in admiralty cases, it has not caused maritime litigation to founder. Were the
Rules amended to extend tendered-defendant practice to all civil cases, the resulting jurisdictional problems would be no more difficult to deal with than
those that now arise in admiralty cases.
Finally, civil courts are already well acquainted with the jurisdictional
problems arising when a plaintiff attempts to pursue a newly joined third party
indemnitor under rule 14(a).20 6 The issues associated with this now-existing
procedure are not wholly dissimilar from those that would arise in the tendereddefendant situation. Considering this, courts already possess the jurisprudential
wherewithal to resolve tendered-defendant jurisdictional problems that arise in
civil cases.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 1946 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, which eliminated tendered-defendant impleader from general civil practice, was an unwarranted solution to a nonexistent problem. Despite the concerns of that
amendment's proponents, the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by direct-tender practice have never been intractable. Indeed, the availability of direct-tender impleader in admiralty cases ipso facto demonstrates the
manageability of the practice. Procedurally, means exist to compel a plaintiff to
pursue a tendered third party in the unlikely event that she is reluctant to do so.
Jurisdictionally, tendered claims are often supported by an independent basis of
subject-matter jurisdiction. That an independent basis may sometimes be absent
opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim.") (emphasis added).
203. An independent basis ofjurisdiction is always required for a rule 13(b) permissive counterclaim because factual nonrelatedness is prerequisite to joinder under that rule. A factually nonrelated claim never can qualify for a supplemental basis of jurisdiction. See, e.g., United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966).
204. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
205. An independent basis ofjurisdiction is required for a joined rule 18(a) claim if it happens to
arise out of a different set of circumstances from the anchor claim. But, in contrast to rule 13(b),

factually related claims can be joined under rule 18(a). Such claims may then qualify for "pendent
claim" supplemental jurisdiction under Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 715.
206. See supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
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is insufficient to justify a universal ban on this useful practice. Moreover,
notwithstanding Kroger and the uncertain state of pendent party jurisdiction after the Supreme Court's 1989 Finley decision, tendered claims arising out of the
same "transaction [or] occurrence" 20 7 as the anchor claim should always qualify
for supplemental jurisdiction when an independent basis is lacking.
But the Federal Rules should not retain tendered-defendant impleader in
admiralty cases and resurrect it in general civil practice merely because it is
unproblematic. Direct tender practice substantially furthers several important
goals of the Federal Rules' broad joinder provisions: it helps to avoid circuity of
action, multiple litigation, and inconsistent judgments, and it promotes settle-

ment. Because tendered-defendant practice liberally encourages joinder of all
potentially culpable parties, it effectively creates a single forum in which courts
can resolve multiple claims against multiple parties in a single lawsuit, and in20 8
creases the likelihood that all the parties will reach an out-of-court resolution.
Furthermore, there is no justification for the Federal Rules' current distinction between admiralty and civil third-party practice. Many of the Rules'
unique admiralty practice provisions are justifiable only because they address
situations that arise peculiarly in maritime litigation. For example, the Rules
establish specialized procedures for in rem actions against vessels and for limitation of liability proceedings. 20 9 But no such maritime anomaly justifies the radical difference between rule 14(a)'s indemnity impleader provision and rule
14(c)'s unique direct-tender provision. Absent a rational basis for these divergent procedures, the goal of greater consistency in federal admiralty and civil
practice2 10 calls for a consistent approach to third-party practice. And because
the important policies underlying direct-tender practice are no less compelling in
civil litigation than in admiralty litigation, the Rules should readopt the nowexisting admiralty practice in all civil cases rather than abrogate the practice
altogether. Doing so not only would result in a more consistent body of federal
practice rules, but also would serve the significant goal of avoiding multiplicitous
federal litigation.

207. Tendered claims necessarily arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the anchor
claim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c) (current rule provides for tendered-defendant impleader in the
admiralty setting). Any nonadmiralty tendered-defendant provision presumably should carry over
this "transaction or occurrence" requirement.
208. The goals underlying tendered-defendant impleader are equally compelling in the context of
state court litigation. Therefore, states that presently do not permit direct tendering, see, e.g., LA.
CODE CIv. P. art. 1111 (West 1984) ("defendant ...may [only] bring in any person ... who is or
may be liable to him for all or part of the principal demand"), cited in Shaffer v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 479 So. 2d 927, 929 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 1985), should consider amending their rules of thirdparty practice to allow it.
209. See Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims C & E (in rem procedures); id. rule F (limitation of liability procedures). Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38
addresses admiralty's penchant for nonjury trials. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e).
210. This goal alone prompted the 1966 unification of admiralty and civil practice.

